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TMI Blog1999 (12) TMI 83X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e Customs Act at all material times except during the relevant period, which we shall notice hereafter, when exemption was granted to it from payment of customs duty by issuance of a notification by the Government of India. Withdrawal of the exemption, and in the meanwhile as per the respondents, writ-petitioners their having taken steps for importing "AUTOCONER" on the basis of exemption notification, resulted in the respondents filing writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution which, as noticed above, was allowed on the terms indicated hereinabove. 3.The customs Notification No. 71/87 was issued on 1st March, 87 whereby machines specified in the Table annexed with that notification were exempted from payment of customs duty on the terms indicated in that notification. "AUTOCONERS" were not included in the Table annexed with the aforesaid notification. This notification was to remain in force uptil 31st March, 1988. Notification No. 71/87, dated 1st March, 87 however was amended by customs Notification No. 246 of 1988, dated 13th September, 1988 whereby "AUTOCONERS" were included in the Table annexed to Notification No. 71/87. The amending Notification No. 246/88 fur ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... S.C.R. (366)] have dealt with the ambit, scope and evaluation of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. It is not the case of the appellants that, in abstract terms this doctrine cannot be attracted or made applicable against the Government but in the facts and circumstances of this case we have to see and consider whether the doctrine can at all be held applicable to the present case, based on the facts about the issuance of the aforesaid notifications and as to whether the respondents/writ-petitioners can be held entitled to invoke this doctrine against the appellants. In the case of Kasinka Trading v. Union of India reported in 1994 (74) E.L.T. 782 their Lordship of the Supreme Court, while dealing with the evolutionary development of the doctrine of promissory estoppel held as under : 'The doctrine of promissory estoppel or equitable estoppel is well established in the administrative law of the country. To put it simply, the doctrine represents a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice. The basis of the doctrine is that where any party has by his word or conduct to made the other party an unequivocal promise or representation by word or conduct, which is intended to crea ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... om payment of duty, additional duty etc. under the Act, as already noticed, flows from the provisions of Section 25(1) of the Act. The power to exempt included the power to modify or withdraw the same. The liability to pay customs duty or additional duty under the Act arises when the taxable event occurs. They are then subject to the payment of duty as prevalent on the date of the entry of the goods. An exemption notification issued under Section 25 of the Act had the effect of suspending the collection of customs duty. It does not make items which are subject to levy of customs duty etc., as items not leviable to such duty. It only suspends the levy of customs duty etc. as item not leviable to such duty. It only suspends the levy and collection of customs duty etc., wholly or partially and subject to such conditions as may be laid down in the notification by the Government in "public interest". Such an exemption by its very nature is susceptible of being revoked or modified or subjected to other conditions. The supersession or revocation of an exemption notification, in the "public interest", is an exercise of the statutory power of the State under the law itself as is obvious fro ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erative till 31st March, 1981 and had made arrangements for importing the goods accordingly and they could not be prejudiced by the withdrawal of that notification before 31-3-1981. We cannot persuade ourselves to accept this submission of the learned Counsel. Merely by mentioning the date as 31st March, 1981, as the date up to which the exemption Notification No. 66/79 was to be operative, no unequivocal representation could be said to have been made that it could not be rescinded or modified before that date even if the Government was satisfied that it was necessary in the public interest to rescind it. Since, the notification had been issued under Section 25(1) of the Act, the very same power was available to the authority for rescinding or modifying that notification and the appellant ought to have known that the said notification was capable of or liable to be revoked, modified or rescinded at any time even before the expiry of 31st March, 1981, if the "public interest" so demanded. To hold that after the Government had issued the Notification 66/79 indicating that it was to remain operative till 31st March, 1981, it could not be rescinded or modified before the expiry of that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lso an exercise of the same statutory power of the Government under the law itself. The power to grant exemption being based on Section 25 of the Act also thus includes the power to modify or withdraw exemption and the liability to pay customs duty thus would start or arise the moment the exemption is modified or withdrawn. Goods thus imported would become subject to the payment of customs duty as prevalent, in terms of Section 15 of the Customs Act. 11.The grant of exemption, in public interest and its withdrawal, again in public interest is the dominant factor although. Their Lordships in Kasinka Trading clearly observed that the plain language of Section 25 of the Customs Act is clearly indicative of the position that it is the public interest and public interest alone which is the over-riding factor while determining the validity of a notification withdrawing exemption from customs duty and that the Courts have to balance the equities between the parties based on such public interest. Public interest thus therefore is the determinative and over-riding consideration in finding out whether the impugned notification should be allowed to operate or not. In the present case the la ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... riod during which it was to remain in force, would make any difference to the situation. In other words, could it be said that an exemption notified without specifying the period which the exemption would remain in force, would be withdrawn in public interest but not the one in which a period has been so specified. Once public interest is accepted as the superior equity, which can override individual equity, the principle should be applicable even in cases where a period has been indicated. The Government is competent to resile from a promise even if there is no manifest public interest involved, provided, of course, no one is put in any adverse situation which cannot be rectified. To adopt the line of reasoning in Emmanual Ayodeji Ajayi v. Briscos - (1964) 3 All. E.R. 556 quoted in M.P. Sugar Mills (supra) even where there is no such overriding public interest, it may still be within the competence of the Government to resile from the promise on giving reasonable notice which need not be a formal notice, giving the promisee a reasonable opportunity of resuming his position, provided, of course, it is possible for the promise to restore the status quo ante. If, however, the promise ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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