1986 (12) TMI 67

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..... house which belonged to the HUF of the deceased but was occupied by the deceased for his residence was of the value of less that Rs. 1 lac. There were only two members of the HUF at the time of death. The Assistant CED therefore, held that 50% of the value of that house was exempt under s. 33(1)(n) of the ED Act. However, taking into consideration the provisions of s. 34(1)(c) he included the remaining 50 per cent being the share of lineal descendant in the estate of the deceased for aggregation for rate purposes. The submission before the Appellate Controller was that in view of s. 33(1) (n) r/w s. 39(3), value of the entire house was exempt and, therefore, nothing could be aggregated for rate purposes under s. 34(1)(c). This submission f .....

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..... ntable person, we have no hesitation in sustaining the order of the Appellate Controller. 4. The second ground is that the Appellate Controller has also erred in deleting the addition of Rs.94,336 made by the Assistant Controller for rate purposes on account of share of the lineal descendant in the ancestral property. Before the Appellate Controller it was stated that the Madras High Court in the case of Asst. CED vs. Devaki Ammal (1973) 91 ITR 24 (Mad) had held s. 34(1) (c) violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution and, therefore, the share of the lineal descendant could not be aggregated for rate purposes. Attention of the Appellate Controller was also drawn to short notes at (1983) 143 ITR (STAT) 67 where a special leave petition by th .....

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..... tion against the judgment of the Madras High Court, the order of the Appellate Controller was sustainable in law. In rebuttal the learned Departmental Representative pointed out that if the Supreme Court refused to grant leave, it does not mean ipso facto that the judgment sought to be appealed against was confirmed as to its ratio and or conclusions particularly when there is no speaking order. He further pointed out that even after hearing on merits, if the Supreme Court is satisfied that there has been no failure of justice, it may dismiss the appeal without deciding the main question sought to be raised in the appeal. For this proposition he relied on the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in the case of CIT vs. Indradaman Amratlal (198 .....

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