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Issues Involved:
1. Interpretation of Section 20(4) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA). 2. Jurisdiction of the Chairperson versus a Member of the Appellate Tribunal. 3. Validity of administrative orders versus judicial orders. 4. Application of res judicata in tribunal proceedings. 5. Powers of the Chairperson under Sections 20 and 30 of FEMA. 6. Alternative remedies and the scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Detailed Analysis: 1. Interpretation of Section 20(4) of FEMA: The primary issue in this case revolves around the interpretation of Section 20(4) of FEMA, which allows either the Chairperson or a Member of the Appellate Tribunal to transfer a case to a Bench of two Members if deemed necessary. The court clarified that both the Chairperson and a Member have concurrent jurisdiction to transfer matters to a two-member bench, but their powers differ procedurally. The Chairperson can transfer a case directly, while a Member must refer the matter to the Chairperson for transfer. 2. Jurisdiction of the Chairperson versus a Member of the Appellate Tribunal: In the present case, a Member of the Tribunal had decided that the matter did not require a two-member bench and passed a judicial order to this effect. Subsequently, the Chairperson, acting administratively, transferred the matter to a two-member bench. The court examined whether the Chairperson had the jurisdiction to override the Member's judicial order. It concluded that the Chairperson's administrative order could not nullify the judicial order passed by the Member, emphasizing that judicial orders cannot be set aside by administrative actions. 3. Validity of Administrative Orders versus Judicial Orders: The court highlighted the distinction between judicial and administrative orders. The judicial order passed by the Member on 11-3-2003, which declined to refer the matter to a two-member bench, was held to be valid and binding. The subsequent administrative order by the Chairperson on 26-3-2003, which referred the matter to a two-member bench, was found to be invalid as it could not override the judicial order. 4. Application of Res Judicata in Tribunal Proceedings: The court applied the principle of res judicata, stating that once the Member had passed a judicial order declining the referral, the parties could not approach the Chairperson for the same relief. The judicial order dated 11-3-2003 operated as res judicata, preventing the parties from seeking a conflicting administrative order from the Chairperson. 5. Powers of the Chairperson under Sections 20 and 30 of FEMA: The court examined the Chairperson's powers under Sections 20 and 30 of FEMA. While Section 30 allows the Chairperson to transfer cases between benches, the court clarified that this power could not be used to nullify a judicial order. The Chairperson's administrative order referring the case to a two-member bench was not a valid exercise of power under Section 30, as it conflicted with the judicial order passed by the Member. 6. Alternative Remedies and the Scope of Judicial Review under Article 226: The respondents argued that the petitioner had an alternative remedy of appeal under Section 35 of FEMA and that the administrative order should not be scrutinized under Article 226 of the Constitution. The court disagreed, stating that the administrative order of the Chairperson was not appealable under Section 35, and hence, the writ petition was maintainable. The court also emphasized that administrative orders could be reviewed under Article 226 if they were unreasonable, capricious, or mala fide. Conclusion: The court quashed and set aside the Chairperson's orders dated 26-3-2003 and 3-4-2003, directing the Appellate Tribunal to hear and dispose of the appeals expeditiously. The judicial order passed by the Member on 11-3-2003 was upheld, reaffirming that administrative actions cannot override judicial decisions. The writ petition was allowed, and the parties were directed to bear their own costs.
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