2003 (1) TMI 67 - HC - Income Tax

Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the interest on borrowed capital to the extent it was invested in immovable properties in question was not allowable as business expenditure under section 36(1)(iii)/37(1) of the Income-tax Act, and whether the finding of the Tribunal is perverse ? - we find that the order of the learned Tribunal suffers from perversity, inasmuch as no reasonable person could have drawn an inference on the facts that this is not a case which could be covered under section 36(1)(iii). Therefore, in view of the decision in CIT v. Associated Fibre and Rubber Industries P. Ltd., the interest paid on the borrowed capital is liable for deduction under section 36(1)(iii) of the 1961 Act. - we allow this appeal and set aside the order of the learned Tribunal. The first part of the question is answered in the negative in favour of the assessee and the second part is answered in affirmative in favour of the assessee.

Issues Involved:
1. Justification of Tribunal's finding on interest on borrowed capital as business expenditure under section 36(1)(iii)/37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
2. Determination of whether the Tribunal's finding is perverse.
3. Commencement of business and its impact on the deductibility of interest.
4. Classification of expenditure as capital or revenue.
5. Interpretation of the term "business" in the context of the Income-tax Act.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Justification of Tribunal's Finding on Interest on Borrowed Capital:
The appellant contended that the Tribunal's finding was perverse and that the interest paid on borrowed capital for acquiring immovable property should be treated as a revenue expenditure. The business in real estate had commenced with the purchase and delivery of the property, and thus, the interest is deductible under section 36(1)(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The appellant argued that the nature and character of the amount should be considered for tax liability, not how it is shown in the accounts.

2. Determination of Whether the Tribunal's Finding is Perverse:
The principle discussed indicates that if the capital was borrowed for business purposes, the interest payable is admissible under section 36(1)(iii), irrespective of whether it is capital or revenue expenditure. The business commences with preparatory activities, and acquisition of immovable property with borrowed capital entitles the assessee to claim the interest deduction. The Tribunal's inference was questioned as it seemed to misinterpret the facts and law.

3. Commencement of Business and Its Impact on Deductibility of Interest:
The judgment highlighted that business activities consist of three stages: acquisition of land, construction, and sale. The business is considered commenced at the first stage. The nature of expenses determines their character, not their presentation in accounts. The acquisition of property and progress of works indicated that the business had commenced, making the interest on borrowed capital deductible.

4. Classification of Expenditure as Capital or Revenue:
The judgment emphasized that the classification as capital or revenue expenditure is immaterial if the expenditure is for business purposes. Even if the property is shown as an asset, the interest on borrowed capital is deductible if it is for business purposes. The Tribunal's focus on the description in accounts rather than the nature of the transaction was deemed incorrect.

5. Interpretation of the Term "Business":
The judgment clarified that "business" includes any adventure or undertaking for profit, even if it is a single transaction. The sporadic nature of transactions does not exclude them from being considered business activities. The judgment referenced several cases to support this interpretation, affirming that the business had commenced with the acquisition of property.

Conclusion:
The judgment concluded that the Tribunal's order was perverse and that the interest on borrowed capital is deductible under section 36(1)(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The appeal was allowed, and the Tribunal's order was set aside. The first part of the question was answered in the negative in favor of the assessee, and the second part was answered in the affirmative in favor of the assessee. The appeal was allowed with no costs.

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