1997 (10) TMI 375 - HC - VAT and Sales Tax

Summary

Issues:
1. Interpretation of eligibility criteria under section 4-A of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948.
2. Validity of lease deeds in relation to the eligibility certificate application.
3. Consideration of supplementary lease deed in determining the date of commencement of the lease.
4. Requirement of mentioning the date of commencement in a registered lease deed.
5. Legal implications of multiple lease deeds in establishing a lease.

Analysis:
The petitioner sought an eligibility certificate under section 4-A of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948, from March 20, 1990. However, the respondent granted the certificate effective from July 20, 1992, citing the absence of a registered lease deed on the date of first sale. The petitioner argued that an unregistered lease deed from January 1, 1990, was later registered on March 23, 1990. Additionally, a supplementary deed executed on January 11, 1992, clarified that the lease deed from March 23, 1990, commenced from January 1, 1990. The petitioner contended that the registered lease deed existed on the date of first sale, contrary to the respondent's assertion.

The Divisional Level Committee rejected the petitioner's claims, emphasizing that the unregistered lease deed from January 1, 1990, was not referenced in the registered deed from March 23, 1990. The petitioner argued that the unregistered deed was notarized on the same day and rent was paid promptly thereafter, indicating its validity. The court noted that the absence of reference in the registered deed did not negate the existence of the unregistered deed. The Committee's failure to consider these crucial aspects led the court to remit the case for reconsideration.

Furthermore, the petitioner contended that the supplementary lease deed from January 11, 1992, clarified the commencement date of the lease, which the Committee overlooked. The court highlighted the importance of considering all relevant documents collectively to determine the lease commencement date accurately.

The petitioner also raised the issue of whether multiple lease deeds could establish a lease, leaving this legal question open for the Committee's future consideration. The court refrained from delving into the legal implications of multiple deeds, emphasizing the Committee's role in addressing such contentions.

Consequently, the court allowed the petition, quashed the impugned order, and directed the Committee to reevaluate the application within three months, considering the observations made in the judgment. The interim order would remain in effect until the review application's decision, provided the petitioner complied with the specified requirements. Failure to adhere to the instructions would result in the discharge of the stay order.