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1961 (1) TMI 70 - SC - Indian LawsWhether these Salt Works come within the definition of the word factory under cl. (m) of s. 2 of the Act? Held that - The appellant s Salt Works do come within the definition of the word ,factory and that the appellant has been rightly convicted of the offence of working the factory without obtaining a licence. We therefore dismiss the appeal.
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the Salt Works come within the definition of the word "factory" under clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948. 2. Whether the process of converting sea water into salt amounts to a "manufacturing process" under clause (k) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948. Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Definition of "Factory" under Clause (m) of Section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 Contention of the Appellant: The appellant argued that the term "premises" in the definition of "factory" refers only to buildings and not to open land. Since the Salt Works consist mostly of open land with only temporary shelters, they should not be classified as a "factory." Court's Analysis: The court disagreed with the appellant's contention. It referred to various lexicons and dictionaries to establish that the term "premises" is a generic term that can mean land, buildings, or both. The court cited definitions from Wharton's Law Lexicon, Cochran's Law Lexicon, Black's Law Dictionary, Earl Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, and Ballentine's Law Dictionary to support this interpretation. The court emphasized that the term "premises" in the context of the Factories Act is not restricted to buildings alone but includes open land. It also noted that the expression "premises including precincts" does not imply that premises must have precincts. The word "including" is meant to enlarge the scope of the term "premises." Internal Evidence in the Act: The court pointed out several sections of the Factories Act that support a broader interpretation of "premises." For instance, section 85 allows the State Government to apply the Act to any place where a manufacturing process is carried on, whether it is open land or buildings. Additionally, section 93 mentions "premises" in a way that indicates it can refer to an entire area with several buildings. Legislative Intent: The court observed that the Act aims to protect workers' welfare and could not have intended to discriminate between workers in buildings and those on open land. The court acknowledged that some provisions of the Act might not apply to salt works, but this does not mean the Act is inapplicable. The Act provides for exemptions where necessary. Precedent Cases: The court reviewed several cases, including Kent v. Astley, Redgrave v. Lee, Nash v. Hollinshead, and others, to demonstrate that historically, the term "premises" has included open land. The court noted that the Factories Act of 1937 explicitly stated that "premises shall not be excluded from the definition of a factory by reason only that they are open air premises." Conclusion: The court held that the Salt Works fall within the definition of "premises" in clause (m) of section 2 of the Act and can be considered a "factory" if the work carried on there qualifies as a "manufacturing process." 2. Definition of "Manufacturing Process" under Clause (k) of Section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 Contention of the Appellant: The appellant argued that the process of converting sea water into salt does not constitute a "manufacturing process" because it relies on natural forces like gravity and solar energy, with minimal human intervention. Court's Analysis: The court disagreed with this contention, stating that it is a "travesty of language" to claim that salt is made without human agency when 47 workmen are employed in the Salt Works. The court noted that human efforts, aided by natural forces, are essential for converting sea water into salt. Detailed Process: The court described the process of making salt, which involves: - Admitting sea water to reservoirs using sluice gates or pumps. - Filling crystallizing beds. - Monitoring the density of brine. - Ensuring other salts do not contaminate the sodium chloride. - Scraping, collecting, grading, and bagging salt crystals. Precedent Cases: The court referred to several cases, including Sedgwick v. Watney Combe, Reid & Company, Limited, Grove v. Lloyds British Testing Co. Ltd., and Kaye v. Burrows & Others, to support its view that the process of converting sea water into salt involves treatment and adaptation, making it a "manufacturing process." Conclusion: The court concluded that the process of converting sea water into salt qualifies as a "manufacturing process" under clause (k) of section 2 of the Act. Final Judgment: The court held that the Salt Works come within the definition of "factory" and that the process of converting sea water into salt is a "manufacturing process." Consequently, the appellant was rightly convicted of operating the factory without obtaining a license. The appeal was dismissed.
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