1983 (9) TMI 301 - HC - Central Excise

Summary

Issues:
1. Jurisdiction of Superintendent to collect Cotton Cess prior to extension of 1923 Act to Mysore.
2. Validity of demand notice for Cotton Cess from 16-3-1923 to 31-3-1966.
3. Interpretation of the 1923 Act as temporary or permanent.
4. Authority of officers appointed under the 1966 Act to recover outstanding amounts under the 1923 Act.
5. Retroactive application of statutory powers to recover outstanding amounts.

Analysis:

Issue 1:
The judgment addresses the jurisdiction of the Superintendent to collect Cotton Cess before the extension of the 1923 Act to Mysore. It is established that the 1923 Act did not apply to the Princely State of Mysore until 1-4-1951, rendering any demand for the period before 31-3-1951 illegal and without jurisdiction.

Issue 2:
The demand notice for Cotton Cess from 16-3-1923 to 31-3-1966 was challenged on several grounds. The petitioner contested the demand on various legal grounds, leading to a detailed examination of the legality of the demand notice issued by the Superintendent.

Issue 3:
The judgment delves into the interpretation of the 1923 Act as either temporary or permanent. The court analyzes the provisions of the Act and concludes that the Act was a perpetual measure. The application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is discussed in the context of the repeal of the 1923 Act.

Issue 4:
Regarding the authority of officers appointed under the 1966 Act to recover outstanding amounts under the 1923 Act, the court scrutinizes the legal framework. It is established that officers appointed under the 1966 Act were not empowered to recover amounts outstanding under the 1923 Act, emphasizing the legal limitations of their authority.

Issue 5:
The judgment also examines the retroactive application of statutory powers to recover outstanding amounts. Citing relevant legal precedents, the court concludes that officers appointed in 1969 under the 1966 Act were not competent to recover outstanding amounts retroactively, leading to the quashing of the impugned demand notices.

In conclusion, the judgment quashes the demand notices issued by the Superintendent, ruling in favor of the petitioner and making the rule absolute in both cases with costs awarded.