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Issues involved:
Challenge to rejection of application for approval under section 80-O of the Income-tax Act on the ground of delay in filing, authority of the Board to condone delay, interpretation of section 80-O, power of the Board to grant approval, reliance on legal precedents. Detailed Analysis: The petitioner filed a writ petition seeking a writ of certiorarified mandamus to quash the order of the second respondent refusing approval of an agreement entered into under section 80-O of the Income-tax Act. The petitioner contended that the delay in filing the application should have been condoned by the Board under section 119 of the Act. The petitioner emphasized that the Board has the power to admit applications for deduction to avoid genuine hardship, and argued that the rejection of the application was contrary to law and arbitrary. The petitioner also highlighted that approval granted for a particular assessment year should apply to the entire duration of the contract, as per legal precedents cited. The petitioner challenged the rejection on the ground that the Board had the authority to condone the delay, and that the approval granted for a subsequent assessment year should cover previous years as well. The Court considered the arguments presented by both parties and analyzed the facts of the case. The Court noted that the power of the Board to condone delay under section 119 of the Act is crucial in cases of genuine hardship caused by delays in filing applications. The Court referred to legal precedents, including the decision in Continental Construction Ltd. v. CIT [1992] 195 ITR 81 (SC), which emphasized that once approval is granted for a contract under section 80-O, it applies to all receipts under the contract, irrespective of the assessment year. The Court also cited the decision in H. S. Anantharamaiah v. CBDT [1993] 201 ITR 526 (Kar), which highlighted the quasi-judicial nature of the Board's power to condone delays and the need for adherence to principles of natural justice. Based on the analysis of the legal provisions and precedents, the Court concluded that the impugned order rejecting the application for approval was contrary to law, arbitrary, and not a proper exercise of power. The Court held that the Board had the authority to condone the delay in filing the application, and the rejection was unjustified. Therefore, the Court allowed the writ petition, quashed the impugned order dated January 3, 1989, and directed the second respondent to grant approval of the agreement entered into under section 80-O of the Income-tax Act. The Court also instructed the other respondents to provide consequential reliefs as necessary. In summary, the judgment addressed the issues of delay in filing the application for approval under section 80-O, the authority of the Board to condone such delays, the interpretation of section 80-O in granting approvals, and the reliance on legal precedents to support the petitioner's case. The Court's detailed analysis highlighted the importance of the Board's power to consider genuine hardships caused by delays and emphasized the need for adherence to legal principles and precedents in such matters.
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