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Issues Involved:
1. Whether obtaining specimen handwriting while in police custody amounts to compulsion under Article 20(3). 2. Whether Section 27 of the Evidence Act is constitutional. 3. The interpretation and scope of Article 20(3) of the Constitution. 4. The admissibility of evidence obtained during police custody. 5. The definition and scope of "testimonial compulsion" under Article 20(3). Detailed Analysis: 1. Whether obtaining specimen handwriting while in police custody amounts to compulsion under Article 20(3): The Court examined whether obtaining specimen handwriting from an accused during police custody constitutes compulsion under Article 20(3) of the Constitution. It was argued that the mere fact of being in police custody does not imply compulsion. The Court held that "the mere fact that the accused was in police custody does not by itself imply that compulsion was used for obtaining the specimen handwritings." The Court further clarified that "if a person gives the specimen handwriting voluntarily, it cannot be said that he was compelled to give it." The Court concluded that compulsion must involve physical force, threat, or inducement, and mere police custody does not amount to compulsion. 2. Whether Section 27 of the Evidence Act is constitutional: The Court discussed the constitutionality of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, which allows the admissibility of information leading to the discovery of facts, even if obtained from an accused in police custody. The Court referenced its decision in the case of State of U.P. v. Deomen Upadhyaya, where it was held that Section 27 does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court further clarified that "the provisions of s. 27 of the Evidence Act are not within the prohibition aforesaid, unless compulsion has been used in obtaining the information." Thus, Section 27 was deemed constitutional, provided no compulsion was involved. 3. The interpretation and scope of Article 20(3) of the Constitution: The Court reexamined the interpretation of Article 20(3) of the Constitution, which states, "No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." The Court noted that the phrase "to be a witness" includes not only oral testimony but also written statements and the production of documents. However, it clarified that "to be a witness" does not include giving thumb impressions, specimen handwriting, or bodily identification marks, as these do not amount to testimonial compulsion. The Court emphasized that "to be a witness" means imparting knowledge of relevant facts, and the protection under Article 20(3) extends beyond the courtroom to include compelled testimony obtained previously. 4. The admissibility of evidence obtained during police custody: The Court addressed the admissibility of evidence obtained during police custody, specifically specimen handwriting and bodily impressions. It held that such evidence is admissible if obtained without compulsion. The Court stated, "The mere questioning of an accused person by a police officer, resulting in a voluntary statement, which may ultimately turn out to be incriminatory, is not compulsion." The Court also noted that the mere fact of being in police custody does not automatically imply compulsion, and it must be determined based on the facts and circumstances of each case. 5. The definition and scope of "testimonial compulsion" under Article 20(3): The Court elaborated on the concept of "testimonial compulsion," stating that it involves coercion or constraint that compels an accused to provide evidence against themselves. The Court distinguished between voluntary acts and compelled acts, emphasizing that "compulsion" must involve physical or psychological pressure. The Court concluded that "testimonial compulsion" does not include the mechanical process of producing documents or giving bodily impressions, as these do not convey personal knowledge or testimony. The Court held that "giving thumb impressions or impressions of foot or palm or fingers or specimen writings or showing parts of the body by way of identification were not included in the expression 'to be a witness'." Separate Judgments: The judgment delivered by Sinha C.J. and the opinions of S.K. Das, Sarkar, and Das Gupta JJ. were aligned in their conclusions but differed in their reasoning. Sinha C.J. emphasized the need to balance the protection against self-incrimination with the requirements of effective criminal investigation. S.K. Das, Sarkar, and Das Gupta JJ. agreed with the conclusions but provided a different approach, emphasizing the broader interpretation of "to be a witness" and the practical implications of testimonial compulsion.
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