2020 (11) TMI 55 - SC - Customs

Validity of conviction made - conviction based solely on the purported confessional statement recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act - evidentiary value present or not - punishment and sentences under NDPS Act - powers of officers to investigate any offences. As per J. (R. F. Nariman) FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND THE NDPS ACT - HELD THAT - The NDPS Act is to be construed in the backdrop of Article 20(3) and Article 21, Parliament being aware of the fundamental rights of the citizen and the judgments of this Court interpreting them, as a result of which a delicate balance is maintained between the power of the State to maintain law and order, and the fundamental rights chapter which protects the liberty of the individual. Several safeguards are thus contained in the NDPS Act, which is of an extremely drastic and draconian nature, as has been contended by the counsel for the Appellants before us. Also, the fundamental rights contained in Articles 20(3) and 21 are given pride of place in the Constitution. After the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution was done away with by the 44th Amendment, it is now provided that even in an Emergency, these rights cannot be suspended see Article 359(1). The interpretation of a statute like the NDPS Act must needs be in conformity and in tune with the spirit of the broad fundamental right not to incriminate oneself, and the right to privacy, as has been found in the recent judgments of this Court. CONFESSIONS UNDER SECTION 25 OF THE EVIDENCE ACT - HELD THAT - Whereas a formal accusation is necessary for invoking the protection under Article 20(3), the same would be irrelevant for invoking the protection under section 25 of the Evidence Act - Section 26 of the Evidence Act extends the protection to confessional statements made by persons while in the custody of a police-officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. Custody is not synonymous with arrest , as has been held in a number of judgments of this Court custody could refer to a situation pre-arrest - section 46 of the CrPC speaks of a submission to the custody by word or action , which would, inter alia, refer to a voluntary appearance before a police officer without any formal arrest being made. PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE NDPS ACT - HELD THAT - Under section 63, which contains the procedure in making confiscations, the first proviso to sub- section (2) makes it clear that no order of confiscation of an article or thing shall be made until the expiry of one month from the date of seizure, or without hearing any person who may claim any right thereto and the evidence which he produces in respect of his claim - Given the stringent provisions of the NDPS Act, together with the safeguards mentioned in the provisions discussed above, it is important to note that statutes like the NDPS Act have to be construed bearing in mind the fact that the severer the punishment, the greater the care taken to see that the safeguards provided in the statute are scrupulously followed. SCOPE OF SECTION 67 OF THE NDPS ACT - HELD THAT - The Constitution Bench s focus was on a completely different point, namely, whether the complainant and the investigator of an offence could be the same. From the point of view of this question, section 53A of the NDPS Act is not relevant and has, therefore, not been referred to by the Constitution Bench. As has been pointed, in order to determine the questions posed, section 53A becomes extremely important, and would, as has been pointed out by us, be rendered otiose if Shri Lekhi s submission, that a statement under section 67 is sufficient to convict an accused of an offence under the Act, is correct. WHETHER AN OFFICER DESIGNATED UNDER SECTION 53 OF THE NDPS ACT CAN BE SAID TO BE A POLICE OFFICER - HELD THAT - Having regard to the statutory scheme contained in the Central Excise Act, more particularly sections 21(1) and proviso (a) to section 21(2), the Court held that a Central Excise officer had no power to submit a charge-sheet under section 173(2) of the CrPC, as such officer is only empowered to send persons who are arrested to a Magistrate under these provisions. The designated officer under section 53, invested with the powers of an officer in charge of a police station, is to forward a police report stating the particulars that are mentioned in section 173(2) CrPC. Because of the special provision contained in section 36A(1) of the NDPS Act, this police report is not forwarded to a Magistrate, but only to a Special Court under section 36A(1)(d) - It is obvious that section 36A(1)(d) is inconsistent with section 2(d) and section 190 of the CrPC and therefore, any complaint that has to be made can only be made under section 36A(1)(d) to a Special Court, and not to a Magistrate under section 190. Shri Lekhi s argument, that the procedure under section 190 has been replaced only in part, the police report and complaint procedure under section 190 not being displaced by section 36A(1)(d), cannot be accepted. Section 36A(1)(d) specifies a scheme which is completely different from that contained in the CrPC. Whereas under section 190 of the CrPC it is the Magistrate who takes cognizance of an offence, under section 36A(1)(d) it is only a Special Court that takes cognizance of an offence under the NDPS Act. Secondly, the complaint referred to in section 36A(1)(d) is not a private complaint that is referred to in section 190(1)(a) of the CrPC, but can only be by an authorised officer. Thirdly, section 190(1)(c) of the CrPC is conspicuous by its absence in section 36A(1)(d) of the NDPS Act the Special Court cannot, upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon its own knowledge, take cognizance of an offence under the NDPS Act. Further, a Special Court under section 36A is deemed to be a Court of Session, for the applicability of the CrPC, under section 36C of the NDPS Act. A Court of Session under section 193 of the CrPC cannot take cognizance as a Court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate. However, under section 36A(1)(d) of the NDPS Act, a Special Court may take cognizance of an offence under the NDPS Act without the accused being committed to it for trial. It is obvious, therefore, that in view of section 36A(1)(d), nothing contained in section 190 of the CrPC can be said to apply to a Special Court taking cognizance of an offence under the NDPS Act. Thus, to arrive at the conclusion that a confessional statement made before an officer designated under section 42 or section 53 can be the basis to convict a person under the NDPS Act, without any non obstante clause doing away with section 25 of the Evidence Act, and without any safeguards, would be a direct infringement of the constitutional guarantees contained in Articles 14, 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution of India. Thus, the officers who are invested with powers under section 53 of the NDPS Act are police officers within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act, as a result of which any confessional statement made to them would be barred under the provisions of section 25 of the Evidence Act, and cannot be taken into account in order to convict an accused under the NDPS Act - a statement recorded under section 67 of the NDPS Act cannot be used as a confessional statement in the trial of an offence under the NDPS Act. AS PER Indira Banerjee, J. - I have gone through the draft judgment prepared by my esteemed brother, Rohinton F. Nariman, J. but have not been able to persuade myself to agree that the officers invested with powers under Section 53 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS Act) are police officers within the meaning of Section 25 of the indian Evidence Act, 1872 or that any confessional statement made to them would be barred under the provisions of Section 25 or 26 of the Evidence Act. In my view, any statement made or document or other thing given to an authorised officer referred to in Section 42 of the NDPS Act or an officer invested under Section 53 with the powers of an Officer in Charge for the purpose of investigation of an offence under the said Act, in the course of any inquiry, investigation or other proceeding, may be tendered in evidence in the trial of an offence under the said Act and proved in accordance with law. I am also unable to agree that a statement recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act cannot be used against an accused offender in the trial of an offence under the NDPS Act. The NDPS Act has been enacted, inter alia, to implement International Conventions relating to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances to which India has been a party and also to implement the Constitutional policy enshrined in Article 47 of the Constitution of India, which casts a duty upon the State to improve public health and also to prohibit consumption, except for medicinal purposes, of drugs which are injurious to health - As stated in its Preamble, the NDPS Act has been enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to narcotic drugs, to make stringent provisions for the control and regulation of operations relating to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, to provide for the forfeiture of property derived from, or used in, illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, to implement the provisions of the International Conventions on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and for matters connected therewith. It is not a penal statute like the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It is a well settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed innocent, unless proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt, except where the statute, on existence of certain circumstances, casts a reverse burden on the accused, to dispel the presumption of guilt, as in the case of Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code and many other statutes, particularly those dealing with socio economic offences. The Legislature may, in public interest, create an offence of strict liability where mens rea is not necessary. There are presumptive provision in the NDPS Act, such as Sections 35, 54 and 66. Under Section 54 of the NDPS Act presumption of commission of an offence may, inter alia, be drawn from the possession of any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance, or any apparatus for manufacture or preparation thereof. The presumption is rebuttable. Having regard to the meaning of the expressions investigate/investigation and enquire/enquiry given in the Dictionary referred to above, the use of the expressions in the statutes referred to above and having regard to the language and tenor of Sections 53, 53A, and Section 67 of the NDPS Act, the expression inquiry may reasonably be construed as a generic expression, which could include the investigation of an offence. An inquiry as contemplated in Section 67 is the collection of information generally, to find out if there has been any contravention of the NDPS Act, whereas investigation is the probing of an offence under the NDPS Act and collection of materials to find out the truth of the case sought to be made out against an accused offender. However investigation may follow an enquiry or be part of an enquiry. This is evident from a reading of the NDPS Act as a whole. Officers under the NDPS Act not being police officers, Sections 161/162 of the Cr.P.C have no application to any statement made before any officer under the NDPS Act, in the course of any inquiry or other proceedings under the NDPS Act - In any case, Section 53A is clearly contrary to and thus overrides Section 162 of the Cr.P.C. While Section 162(1) of the Cr.P.C. provides that no statement made by any person to a police officer, when reduced to writing shall be signed by the person making it, or used for any purpose, save as provided in the proviso to the said section, that is, to confront the person making the statement, if he gives evidence as a witness, Section 53A(1) provides that a statement made and signed by a person before any officer empowered under Section 53 for the investigation of offences, during the course of any inquiry or proceedings by such officer, shall be relevant for the purpose of proving, in any prosecution for an offence under this Act in certain circumstances specified in the said section. A statute may expressly make Section 173 of the Cr.P.C applicable to inquiries and investigations under that statute. However, in the case of a statute like the NDPS Act, where the provisions of the Cr.P.C do not apply to any inquiry/investigation, except as provided therein, it cannot be held that the officer has all the powers of a police officer to file a report under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. The NDPS Act does not even contain any provision for filing a report in a Court of law which is akin to a police report under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. - As per the well established norms of judicial discipline and propriety, a Bench of lesser strength cannot revisit the proposition laid down by at least three Constitution Benches, that an officer can be deemed to be a police officer within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act only if the officer is empowered to exercise all the powers of a police officer including the power to file a report under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. With the greatest of respect, Counsel appearing in support of the appeals have made general arguments with regard to the differences between provisions of the Central Excise Act or the Customs Act with the NDPS Act. However, they have not specifically shown how exactly the powers of NDPS officers conducting an investigation of an offence under the NDPS Act are different from those of the Central Excise Officers, Customs officers and/or Railway Protection Force Officers conducting an inquiry into an offence under the provisions of those Acts - As observed above, the provisions of the Cr.P.C do not apply to an inquiry/investigation under the NDPS Act except to the limited extent provided in Section 50(5) and 51. Section 173 of the Cr.P.C has not been made applicable to the NDPS Act.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the officers under the NDPS Act are police officers within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act.
2. Whether a statement recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act can be used as a confessional statement in the trial of an offence under the NDPS Act.

Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Whether the officers under the NDPS Act are police officers within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act:
The judgment discusses the powers conferred on officers under the NDPS Act and whether these officers can be considered police officers under Section 25 of the Evidence Act. It was determined that officers under Section 53 of the NDPS Act, who are vested with the powers of an officer-in-charge of a police station for the investigation of offences under the Act, are indeed "police officers" within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. This means that any confessional statement made to these officers would be barred under Section 25 of the Evidence Act and cannot be used to convict an accused under the NDPS Act. The judgment also highlights that the NDPS Act is a stringent measure to combat drug-related crimes and includes several safeguards to balance investigation and trial with the fundamental rights of the accused.

2. Whether a statement recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act can be used as a confessional statement in the trial of an offence under the NDPS Act:
The judgment clarifies that statements recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act cannot be used as confessional statements in the trial of an offence under the Act. Section 67 allows officers to call for information, require the production of documents, and examine persons acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case. However, such statements are not admissible as confessional evidence against the accused in a trial. The judgment emphasizes that the NDPS Act does not contain a non-obstante clause that overrides Section 25 of the Evidence Act, unlike other statutes such as TADA and POTA, which explicitly make confessional statements to police officers admissible.

Separate Judgment by Indira Banerjee, J.:
Justice Indira Banerjee delivered a separate judgment, disagreeing with the majority opinion. She argued that officers under the NDPS Act are not police officers within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act and that statements made to these officers can be used against the accused in a trial. She emphasized that the NDPS Act is a complete code and should be interpreted in a manner that gives effect to its provisions. She also highlighted the importance of balancing the need for stringent measures to combat drug trafficking with the protection of the fundamental rights of the accused.

Conclusion:
The majority judgment held that officers under the NDPS Act are police officers within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, and statements recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act cannot be used as confessional statements in trials under the Act. Justice Indira Banerjee dissented, arguing that such officers are not police officers under Section 25 of the Evidence Act and that statements made to them can be used against the accused. The appeals and special leave petitions were sent back to Division Benches for disposal on merits in light of the judgment.