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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the plaintiff's land is an "estate" as defined in section 2(g) of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951. 2. Whether the plaintiff is an "intermediary" within the meaning of section 2(h) of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951. 3. Whether the plaintiff is estopped by the compromise decree passed by the Patna High Court on 2nd May 1945 from contending that his land is not an "estate" within the meaning of the Abolition Act. Detailed Analysis: Issue 1: Whether the plaintiff's land is an "estate" as defined in section 2(g) of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951 The plaintiff contended that his land was not an "estate" as defined in section 2(g) of the Abolition Act, which requires the land to be held by an "intermediary" and included under one entry in the general registers of revenue-paying lands and revenue-free lands prepared and maintained under the law for the time being in force. The plaintiff argued that the register in which his land was included was not prepared or maintained under the Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876, and that his land was never subject to the payment of land revenue for which a separate engagement had been entered into. The State, however, argued that the land was indeed an "estate" within the meaning of the Abolition Act and had been held as such since 1803. The court concluded that the definition in section 2(g) was meant to identify the particular register and that the validity of the inclusion of the land in the register was irrelevant for the purpose of the Abolition Act. Thus, the court accepted the State's contention that the plaintiff's land was an "estate" within the meaning of the Abolition Act. Issue 2: Whether the plaintiff is an "intermediary" within the meaning of section 2(h) of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951 Section 2(h) of the Abolition Act defines an "intermediary" as a proprietor, among other things. The plaintiff claimed to be the proprietor of his land. The court noted that if the land is an "estate," the plaintiff is clearly an "intermediary." The court found that the plaintiff's land was included under one entry in the general register of revenue-paying lands, and thus the plaintiff was indeed an "intermediary" as defined in the Abolition Act. Issue 3: Whether the plaintiff is estopped by the compromise decree passed by the Patna High Court on 2nd May 1945 from contending that his land is not an "estate" within the meaning of the Abolition Act The State argued that the plaintiff was estopped by the compromise decree from contending that his land was not an "estate." The court considered whether the plea of estoppel could be raised, noting that it had been pointedly raised and dealt with in the High Court. The court found that the compromise decree, which acknowledged the State's title to the disputed river beds and recognized the plaintiff's title as the holder of a permanently settled estate, effectively precluded the plaintiff from re-asserting a sovereign status. The court held that the compromise decree created an estoppel by judgment, as it was intended to put a stop to litigation between the parties and was as effective as a judgment resulting from a contested case. The court also found that the compromise decree constituted an estoppel by representation, as the plaintiff's acknowledgment of his status as a Zemindar of a permanently settled estate was a main consideration for the compromise. The court concluded that the High Court had erred in its findings on the issue of estoppel and that the plaintiff was indeed estopped from contending that his land was not an "estate." Conclusion: The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the plaintiff's land was an "estate" within the meaning of the Abolition Act, the plaintiff was an "intermediary," and the plaintiff was estopped by the compromise decree from contending otherwise. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
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