1959 (1) TMI 27 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:

1. Validity of trial procedure under the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949.
2. Constitutionality of Section 36(1) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949.
3. Validity of notifications issued under Section 20 of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949.
4. Effect of the expiration of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949 on ongoing proceedings.
5. Prejudice caused to the appellant due to the adoption of summons procedure instead of warrant procedure.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of trial procedure under the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949:

The appellant contended that the charges framed against him had to be tried according to the procedure prescribed for the trial of warrant cases. However, the learned trial magistrate tried all the cases according to the procedure prescribed for the trial of summons cases, which the appellant argued made all the proceedings void. The court examined the procedural differences between summons and warrant procedures, noting that under the former, a charge is not framed, and the accused gets only one chance to cross-examine prosecution witnesses, whereas under the latter, the accused can cross-examine witnesses twice. The court acknowledged that the cases were tried under the summons procedure by reason of Section 36 of the Act and the notification issued under it. However, the appellant argued that the relevant provisions of the Act were ultra vires and that the proceedings continued under the summons procedure even after the Act had expired.

2. Constitutionality of Section 36(1) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949:

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of Section 36(1) of the Act, arguing that it violated the fundamental right of equality before the law guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution. The court held that Article 14 does not forbid reasonable classifications for the purpose of legislation. The classification must be based on an intelligible differentia and must have a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. The court found that the classification based on territorial or geographical basis was rational, considering the unprecedented civil commotion and strife in the dangerously disturbed areas. The court concluded that the impugned provision did not violate Article 14 and was constitutional and valid.

3. Validity of notifications issued under Section 20 of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949:

The court examined the four notifications issued under Section 20 of the Act. The second notification canceled the first notification with effect from October 1, 1950. The third notification introduced an exception to the cancellation, treating the Province of Delhi as a dangerously disturbed area in respect of things done or omitted to be done before the date of the notification. The court found that the third notification was invalid as it went beyond the authority conferred by Section 20. The fourth notification, issued on April 7, 1951, also attempted to continue the summons procedure for pending cases but was found to be outside the authority conferred by the second part of Section 36(1).

4. Effect of the expiration of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949 on ongoing proceedings:

The court held that, after the expiration of the Act on August 14, 1951, the procedure laid down in it could no longer be invoked in the pending cases against the appellant. The court rejected the argument that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act could be invoked, as it deals with the effect of the repeal of permanent statutes. The court concluded that the continuation of the trial under the summons procedure after the expiration of the Act was invalid.

5. Prejudice caused to the appellant due to the adoption of summons procedure instead of warrant procedure:

The court found that the failure to frame charges and the denial of the opportunity to cross-examine prosecution witnesses twice, as provided under the warrant procedure, caused prejudice to the appellant. The court held that the continuation of the trial under the summons procedure subsequent to October 1, 1950, vitiated the trial and rendered the final orders of conviction and sentence invalid.

Conclusion:

The court set aside the orders of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant in all three cases. Given the gravity of the offences, the court directed a de novo trial according to law and instructed that the proceedings be commenced without delay and disposed of expeditiously.

Appeal allowed. Retrial ordered.