1913 (8) TMI 1 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Court to try the suit.
2. Classification of the land as 'old waste' and its implications.
3. Definition and classification of 'ryoti land.'
4. Definition and classification of 'ryot.'
5. Entitlement to rent and mesne profits.
6. Applicability of the Madras Estates Land Act provisions.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Jurisdiction of the Court to Try the Suit:
The primary issue was whether the suit, initially filed in the Munsif's Court, was cognizable by the said court. The Munsif returned the plaint to be presented to the Revenue Court, which again returned it to the Munsif's Court. The District Court set aside the Revenue Court's order and directed it to try the suit. The determination of jurisdiction depended on the allegations in the plaint and the plaintiff's case. The High Court concluded that the lands in dispute fell within the definition of 'old waste' under Section 3 Clause 7 of the Madras Estates Land Act. Consequently, the suit for ejectment of tenants of old waste, who are not ryots, is cognizable by the Civil Court, not the Revenue Court.

2. Classification of the Land as 'Old Waste' and Its Implications:
The lands in question were classified as 'old waste' under Section 3 Clause 7 of the Madras Estates Land Act, which includes land that has remained uncultivated and in the possession of the Zemindar for 10 years. The court noted that old waste lands could be either ryoti lands or non-ryoti lands. However, to be classified as ryoti land, the landlord must have obtained a final decree from a competent Civil Court establishing that the ryot has no occupancy right before the Act's passing. The lands in question were pasture waste, not permanently cultivable, and hence not ryoti land.

3. Definition and Classification of 'Ryoti Land':
Ryoti land is defined under Section 3 Clause 16 as cultivable land other than private land, communal land, or service tenure land. The court clarified that ryoti land must be permanently cultivable for all practical purposes. The lands in question were primarily used for pasturage and not for permanent cultivation, thus not qualifying as ryoti land. The presumption under Section 23 of the Act that land is ryoti land does not apply here as the land is clearly old waste, not ryoti land.

4. Definition and Classification of 'Ryot':
A ryot is defined under Section 3 Clause 15 as a person who holds land for the purpose of agriculture and ryoti land. The tenants of old waste, which is not ryoti land, do not qualify as ryots. Additionally, agriculture, as defined in the Act, does not include pasturage. The court referred to the Select Committee's Report, which explicitly excluded pasturage from the definition of agriculture. Thus, the tenants in this case, holding land for pasturage, do not qualify as ryots.

5. Entitlement to Rent and Mesne Profits:
The plaintiff claimed rent for Fuslies 1317 and 1318 based on Muchilikas and mesne profits subsequent to the date of the suit. The court noted that the plaintiff, if his allegations were true, was entitled to recover rent at the Sagubadi dry rate of the nearest piece of land in the village for Fuslies 1317 and 1318, but not at the higher wet cultivation rate. The lower courts had not examined whether there was an application by a darkhastdar in April 1907 and the appropriate rate of rent. The court also clarified that pasturage rent due by tenants who are not ryots falls under the jurisdiction of ordinary courts, not the Revenue Court.

6. Applicability of the Madras Estates Land Act Provisions:
The court examined various provisions of the Madras Estates Land Act to determine the applicability to the case. Section 199 Clause 1 bars the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in certain specified cases, but the general jurisdiction of Civil Courts remains for all other classes of cases. Sections 153, 48 (ii), and 158 relate to the ejectment of ryots and tenants of private land, which did not apply to the defendants in this case as they were not ryots. Section 77, which relates to arrears of rent, confines the expression to sums payable for the use of land for agriculture, excluding pasturage.

Conclusion:
The High Court set aside the original orders of the Munsif and the District Court, directing the plaint to be received by the Munsif if presented within two weeks. The Munsif was instructed to dispose of the suit according to law. The judgment emphasized that the suit for ejectment of tenants of old waste, not ryoti land, and the recovery of pasturage rent falls under the jurisdiction of Civil Courts, not Revenue Courts.