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1913 (8) TMI 1

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..... ts, when notice was issued to them to take up the lands themselves at the higher rate, failed to take them up. (b) For recovery of rent for Fuslies 1317 and 1318 at the rates offered by a person who applied for grant of the lands on Dharkast in April 1907. (c) For mesne profits subsequent to date of suit till delivery, that is mesne profits for Fasli 1319 &c. 4. There was first the question, whether this suit, which was originally filed in the Munsif's Court, was cognizable by the said Court. The Munsif returned the plaint to be presented to the Revenue Court. The Revenue Court again returned it to be presented to the Munsif's Court. There was an appeal against this order of the Revenue Court to the District Court, which set aside the Revenue Court's order and directed it to try the suit. The question as to which Court has jurisdiction to try this case depends it need hardly be said upon the allegations in the plaint and upon the case set up by the plaintiff in the plaint. Assuming for this 'purpose that the allegations in the plaint, supplemented by the plaintiff's documents are correct, it seems to us clear that the lands in dispute fall within the definit .....

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..... next question is whether the tenant of such old waste let for pasture is a ryot. A ryot is defined in Section 3 Clause 15 as a person who holds (a) for the purpose of agriculture (b) ryoti land. The tenant of an old waste which is not ryoti land does not there-fore come under the definition of ryot. On another ground also, the tenants of the plaint land are not ryots, because they do not hold land for the purpose of agriculture. Agriculture is defined in the Act as including horticulture. See Section 3 Clause 1. The ordinary meaning of agriculture is the raising of annual or periodical grain crops through the operations of ploughing, sowing etc. In Soman Gope v. Raghnbir Ojha (1896) I . L.R. 24 C. 160 it was held under the Bengal Tenancy Act that to turn land let for agricultural purpose into an orchard was to render it unfit for the purchase of the tenancy. In Lakshmana v. Bamachandra(1887) I.L.R. 10 M. 351 the same principle was laid down. See also Murugesa Chetti v. Chinnathumbi Goundan (1901) I.L.R. 24 M. 421 While agriculture is by a special definition made to include horticulture in the Estates Land Act it has not been made to include Silviculture and pasturing. This clearly .....

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..... that section does not apply. Section 48 (ii) also relates to the ejectment of a ryot who fails to make a certain declaration. Section 158 relates to a tenant of private land. It is thus clear that the present suit so far as it prays for ejectment of a' tenant not being a ryot of old waste not being ryoti land, let for pasture purposes and not agriculture, is not cognisable by a Collector but only by a Civil Court. The Munaif's original order returning the plaint to be presented to the Revenue Court and the District Court's order on appeal from the Revenue Court deciding that the Revenue Court alone had jurisdiction are erroneous so far as the claim relates to the ejectment of the defendants and the recovery of mesne profits from fasli 1319 downwards is concerned. As regards the rent claimed for faslis 1317 and 1318, the plaintiff, if his allegations are true, is entitled on the Muchilikas for faslis 1317 and 1318 to recover under the 4th paragraph of the Muchilika rent at the Sagubadi dry rate of the nearest piece of land in the village though he may not be entitled to the higher wet cultivation rent at the rate offered by the alleged darkhastdar. The Lower Courts have .....

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..... lved in this appeal is whether the Special Deputy Collector of Nellore presiding in the Revenue Courts had jurisdiction to try the suit out of which the appeal arises in which the plaintiff claims to be put into possession of the property referred to in the plaint removing the defendants therefrom; the plaintiff also claims '' mesne profits" and other incidental reliefs. The plaint was in the first instance presented in the Munsif's Court but the Munsif held that he had no jurisdiction to try the suit. The Special Deputy Collector also held that he had no power to order the defendants to be ejected from the land and dismissed the suit. 11. The jurisdiction of the Revenue Courts so far as is material for the present case is derived from Section 189 of the Madras Estates Land Act (Madras Act I of 1908) and the jurisdiction of Civil Courts is by the same section taken away to the same extent to which it is granted to Revenue Courts. It would therefore seem clear that in regard to any matter in which Civil Courts ordinarily have jurisdiction they retain that jurisdiction unless it is acquired by the Revenue Courts and that the ordinary jurisdiction of the Civil Courts .....

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..... ncluded in the term ' cultivation' as it is employed in the Madras Estates Land Act seems also to be indicated by a consideration of Section 6 Clauses 1 and 4; the latter clause expressly provides that "admission to waste land under a contract for the pasturage of cattle...shall not by itself confer upon the person so admitted a permanent right of occupancy." At the same time it is provided in Section 6(1) that " every ryoti in possession...of ryoti land not being old waste...shall have a permanent right of occupancy in his holding." As the 4th sub-section of the same section provides that admission to waste land under contract for the pasturage of cattle...does not by itself confer upon the person so admitted a permanent right of occupancy," it would appear that the legislature did not conterplate pasture land as being ryoti land. The tenant of such land equally does not come under the definition of a ryot in Section 3 (15) which requires the land to be ryoti land and to be held for the purpose of agriculture in order that the tenant may be termed a ryot. It was argued before us that this land falls with in the definition of 'old waste' in .....

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