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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the appellant was a statutory body. 2. Whether the termination of the plaintiff/respondent's service was valid without the Vice-Chancellor's approval. 3. Whether the plaintiff/respondent was entitled to a declaration and injunction. 4. The applicability of exceptions to the general rule against specific enforcement of personal service contracts. Detailed Analysis: 1. Whether the appellant was a statutory body: The primary issue was whether the Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College (the appellant) could be considered a statutory body. The Court held that to be classified as a statutory body, an institution must be created by or under a statute and owe its existence to that statute. The appellant, registered under the Registration of Cooperative Societies Act, was not created by a statute but was governed by statutory provisions for proper maintenance and administration. The Court distinguished between bodies created by statute and those adopting statutory provisions. It concluded that the appellant was not a statutory body, as it had an independent existence before affiliating with the Agra University and was merely governed by statutory provisions for convenience. 2. Whether the termination of the plaintiff/respondent's service was valid without the Vice-Chancellor's approval: The Court examined whether the termination of the plaintiff/respondent's service without the Vice-Chancellor's approval was valid under Section 25-C(2) of the Agra University Act. The section mandates that termination of a teacher's service by the management of an affiliated college must be approved by the Vice-Chancellor to be effective. The Court found that the appellant did not follow this procedure, making the termination invalid and without jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that the statutory requirement of the Vice-Chancellor's approval was not met, rendering the termination ineffective. 3. Whether the plaintiff/respondent was entitled to a declaration and injunction: The Court considered whether the plaintiff/respondent was entitled to a declaration that he continued in service and an injunction restraining the appellant from interfering with his duties. The Court noted that the relief of declaration and injunction under the Specific Relief Act is discretionary and not a matter of right. Given the peculiar facts and circumstances, including the plaintiff/respondent's short tenure and the potential financial burden on the appellant, the Court decided against granting the declaration and injunction. Instead, it allowed the plaintiff/respondent to retain the amounts already deposited by the appellant as compensation. 4. The applicability of exceptions to the general rule against specific enforcement of personal service contracts: The Court reiterated the general rule that contracts of personal service are not specifically enforceable, with three well-recognized exceptions: (i) public servants dismissed in contravention of Article 311 of the Constitution, (ii) reinstatement under industrial law, and (iii) statutory bodies acting in breach of mandatory statutory obligations. The Court found that the appellant did not fall within these exceptions as it was not a statutory body. Even if the appellant were considered a public or local authority, the Court exercised its discretion against granting specific performance due to the significant financial implications and potential harm to the educational institution. Conclusion: The appeal was allowed, and the judgment of the High Court and the First Additional Civil & Sessions Judge was set aside. The plaintiff/respondent's suit was dismissed, and the judgment of the Trial Court was restored. The Court emphasized the discretionary nature of relief under the Specific Relief Act and the need to balance justice and fairness in its exercise.
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