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Issues Involved:
1. Interpretation of the phrase "in the interest of public order" in Article 19(2) of the Constitution. 2. Constitutional validity of Section 3 of the U.P. Special Powers Act, 1932, in light of Article 19(1)(a) and Article 19(2) of the Constitution. 3. Applicability of the doctrine of severability to Section 3 of the U.P. Special Powers Act, 1932. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Interpretation of the Phrase "In the Interest of Public Order" in Article 19(2) of the Constitution The core issue was the interpretation of "in the interest of public order" as mentioned in Article 19(2) of the Constitution. The court analyzed the term "public order" and concluded that it has a wide connotation, encompassing the orderly state of society where citizens can peacefully pursue their normal activities. The court referenced previous judgments, including Romesh Thappar v. The State of Madras and Brij Bhushan v. The State of Delhi, to elucidate that "public order" includes both major offences affecting the security of the State and minor breaches of peace of local significance. The court noted that the phrase "in the interest of public order" is broader than "for the maintenance of public order" and includes any law that has a proximate relationship to maintaining public order. 2. Constitutional Validity of Section 3 of the U.P. Special Powers Act, 1932 The court examined Section 3 of the U.P. Special Powers Act, 1932, which penalized instigating any person or class of persons not to pay dues recoverable as arrears of land revenue. The court dissected the section into its components, noting its wide scope that could criminalize even innocuous speeches. The court emphasized that for a restriction to be valid under Article 19(2), it must be reasonable and have a proximate connection to public order. The court found that Section 3 did not establish any such proximate connection and thus was not a reasonable restriction. The court rejected the argument that instigation of a single individual not to pay tax could ignite a revolutionary movement, deeming such a connection too remote and hypothetical. 3. Applicability of the Doctrine of Severability to Section 3 of the U.P. Special Powers Act, 1932 The court considered whether Section 3 could be severed to exclude unconstitutional parts while retaining valid portions. The learned Advocate General suggested modifying the section to apply only to a class of persons. However, the court referenced the principle from Romesh Thappar's case and Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, which held that if a law authorizes restrictions both within and beyond constitutional limits, it is not severable and must be struck down entirely. The court also considered the decision in R. M. D. Chamarbaugwalla v. The Union of India, which provided a more nuanced approach to severability but concluded that the provisions of Section 3 were too inextricably mixed to apply the doctrine of severability effectively. Conclusion The court ultimately held that Section 3 of the U.P. Special Powers Act, 1932, was void as it infringed upon the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The section was struck down in its entirety, and the appeal was dismissed. The court refrained from advising on how the State could re-draft the section to conform to constitutional provisions, emphasizing that it was not within the court's province to provide such guidance.
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