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Issues Involved:
1. Constitutional validity of Section 7(1)(c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949. 2. Infringement of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. 3. Whether the restriction imposed by Section 7(1)(c) falls within the exceptions provided under Article 19(2). Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Constitutional Validity of Section 7(1)(c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949: The petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of Section 7(1)(c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, which was extended to the Delhi Province. The section authorized the Provincial Government or any authorized authority to require that any matter relating to a particular subject or class of subjects be submitted for scrutiny before publication if it was deemed necessary for preventing or combating activities prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order. The petitioners argued that this provision infringed their fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. 2. Infringement of the Fundamental Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression under Article 19(1)(a): The petitioners contended that the imposition of pre-censorship on their journal constituted a restriction on the liberty of the press, which is an essential part of the right to freedom of speech and expression. They argued that this restriction was not justified under Article 19(2) of the Constitution, which allows for reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to freedom of speech and expression in the interests of the security of the State, public order, decency, or morality, among other grounds. 3. Whether the Restriction Imposed by Section 7(1)(c) Falls within the Exceptions Provided under Article 19(2): The majority judgment, delivered by Patanjali Sastri J., concluded that the restriction imposed by Section 7(1)(c) did not fall within the exceptions provided under Article 19(2). The judgment referenced the decision in Petition No. XVI of 1950 (Romesh Thappar v. The State of Madras), which had similar considerations. The Court held that the imposition of pre-censorship on a journal was a restriction on the liberty of the press and that Section 7(1)(c) did not fall within the scope of Article 19(2). Consequently, the petition was allowed, and the impugned order of the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, dated 2nd March 1950, was quashed. Separate Dissenting Judgment by Fazl Ali J.: Fazl Ali J. delivered a dissenting judgment, emphasizing that the provisions of Section 7(1)(c) were not in general terms but were confined to a "particular subject or class of subjects" connected with public safety or the maintenance of public order. He argued that the Act was a special legislation providing for special measures in situations requiring such measures, and it was not intended for ordinary cases of breaches of public order. He further stated that public safety and public order were allied concepts, and the Act aimed at preventing serious cases of public disorder that could affect public safety or the security of the State. Fazl Ali J. concluded that the impugned law was fully saved by Article 19(2) and that the Chief Commissioner acted within his legal authority. Therefore, he would have dismissed the petitioners' application. Conclusion: The majority judgment allowed the petition and quashed the impugned order, holding that the restriction imposed by Section 7(1)(c) was not justified under Article 19(2) and infringed the petitioners' fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. The dissenting judgment by Fazl Ali J. supported the validity of the impugned law, emphasizing its special nature and the context of public safety and public order.
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