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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the District Government Counsel's request for adjournment to file a written statement constituted taking a step in the proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. 2. Whether the High Court erred in reversing the trial court's discretion to stay the suit under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Whether the District Government Counsel's request for adjournment to file a written statement constituted taking a step in the proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act: The plaintiffs instituted a suit for damages for breach of contract against the State of U.P. and the Divisional Forest Officer, Bijnor. The District Government Counsel, representing the State, requested an adjournment to file a written statement. Subsequently, the State filed an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act to stay the suit, citing an arbitration clause in the agreement. The trial court granted the stay, holding that the State had not taken any steps in the suit proceedings. On appeal, the High Court reversed this decision, relying on previous judgments (United Provinces Government v. Sri Har Nath and Union of India v. Hans Raj Gupta and Company) to hold that the request for adjournment amounted to taking a step in the proceedings under Section 34. The High Court concluded that this action disqualified the State from seeking a stay of the suit. In the Supreme Court, the State argued that the District Government Counsel had no instructions to seek the adjournment and thus his action could not bind the State. The Court examined precedents, including Punjab State v. Moji Ram and State of Himachal Pradesh v. Lalchand Shahi, which suggested that an adjournment request without instructions did not constitute taking a step in the proceedings. However, the Court emphasized that the District Government Counsel, authorized under the CPC to act on behalf of the State, must be presumed to have been duly empowered to take necessary steps, including seeking adjournments. The Court found that the District Government Counsel's request for adjournment was specific to filing a written statement and was made within his authority. Consequently, this act constituted taking a step in the proceedings under Section 34, disqualifying the State from seeking a stay. 2. Whether the High Court erred in reversing the trial court's discretion to stay the suit under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act: The State contended that the trial court's discretion to stay the suit should not have been reversed by the High Court. The Supreme Court noted that discretion under Section 34 should be exercised based on sound judicial principles. The Court referenced The Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothen Joseph, which held that an appellate court should interfere with the trial court's discretion only if it was exercised unreasonably or capriciously. The Supreme Court found no serious infirmity in the High Court's judgment. It emphasized that the mere existence of an arbitration clause does not bar a suit or obligate the court to stay proceedings. The right to institute a suit is a general legal right, and a party seeking to curtail this right must strictly comply with the law. The Court concluded that the High Court correctly determined that the District Government Counsel's request for adjournment constituted taking a step in the proceedings, making the application for stay under Section 34 incompetent. The High Court's decision to reverse the trial court's order was justified. Conclusion: The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's judgment, affirming that the District Government Counsel's request for adjournment to file a written statement constituted taking a step in the proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. Consequently, the State was disqualified from seeking a stay of the suit. The appeal was dismissed with costs, and the suit would proceed to be tried on its merits in a competent court.
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