1996 (9) TMI 632 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Declaration of title and recovery of possession.
2. Adverse possession claim by the defendant.
3. Jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 100 CPC.
4. Application of Article 139 of the old Limitation Act.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Declaration of Title and Recovery of Possession:
The plaintiff filed a suit on 13.6.1962 for declaration of her title to the suit property and for recovery of possession. The property, measuring 1.13 acres, was purchased by the plaintiff under a registered sale deed dated 21.3.1957. The defendant, who was in possession of the property as a tenant under a registered lease deed dated 1.4.1935, denied his status as a lessee and claimed title in himself. The Trial Court found that the plea of surrender was not established and the defendant did not prescribe title by adverse possession. It decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff, declaring her entitlement to the property and directing the defendant to surrender possession.

2. Adverse Possession Claim by the Defendant:
The defendant claimed that after the expiry of the lease, he surrendered possession and later re-entered the property in his own right, thereby prescribing title by adverse possession. The Trial Court rejected this claim, noting that the defendant's possession was permissive and not adverse. The First Appellate Court also upheld this finding, stating that there was no evidence of the defendant asserting an independent title before 27.4.1957. The High Court, however, reversed these findings, but the Supreme Court found that the lower courts had correctly appreciated the evidence and that the High Court had erred in its re-appreciation.

3. Jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 100 CPC:
The appellant argued that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC by reversing the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The Supreme Court reiterated that interference with concurrent findings should be avoided unless warranted by compelling reasons. The High Court is not expected to re-appreciate evidence to replace the findings of the lower courts. The Supreme Court found that the High Court had indeed exceeded its jurisdiction by re-appreciating the evidence and reversing the findings of the lower courts.

4. Application of Article 139 of the Old Limitation Act:
The defendant's counsel argued that the suit was barred by limitation under Article 139 of the old Limitation Act, which corresponds to Article 67 of the new Limitation Act, 1963. The Supreme Court noted that no plea regarding Article 139 was taken in the trial court, and no issue was framed on this aspect. The date on which the tenancy is determined is the date from which the limitation period begins to run. The defendant claimed to have surrendered the property and re-entered it, but this was not accepted by the lower courts. The Supreme Court held that the defendant's possession after the lease expiry was permissive and did not constitute adverse possession. The suit, filed within five years of the defendant's hostile claim in 1957, was not barred by limitation.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court found that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the judgments of the lower courts. The appeal was allowed, and the judgment of the High Court was set aside. The plaintiff's suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession was upheld.