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Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the award made beyond the two-year period stipulated by Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act. 2. Allegation of inordinate delay in making the award. Detailed Analysis: Issue 1: Validity of the Award Beyond the Two-Year Period The petitioner argued that the award was not made within the two-year period from the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, as required by the proviso to Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act. The petitioner contended that the award should be considered made on the date the notice was served (30th September 1986), which was beyond the stipulated two-year period. The High Court rejected this contention, and the Supreme Court affirmed this decision. The Supreme Court noted that before the insertion of Section 11-A, there was no time limit for making an award. Section 11-A was introduced to prevent undue delays in acquisition proceedings, which caused hardship to affected parties. The Court emphasized that the crucial words in Section 11-A are "the Collector shall make an award," which means the award must be signed within the two-year period, not necessarily served within that period. The Court distinguished this case from the precedent set in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, where the limitation period for seeking a reference under Section 18 was calculated from the date of service of the award notice. The Court reasoned that the purpose and consequences of the limitation periods under Sections 11-A and 18 are different. Section 11-A is intended to prevent official delay, while Section 18 provides a remedy for landowners to seek fair compensation. The Court concluded that "to make an award" means to sign the award within the two-year period, regardless of when the notice is served. This interpretation prevents the reduction of the statutory period due to delays in serving notices and avoids potential manipulation by interested parties to defeat acquisition proceedings. Issue 2: Allegation of Inordinate Delay The petitioner also argued that the award should be quashed due to inordinate delay, as it was made at the end of the two-year period. The Supreme Court found little substance in this argument. While the Court expects awards to be made promptly, it held that as long as the award is made within the statutory two-year period, the acquisition proceeding remains valid. The Court emphasized that setting aside an award on the ground of delay, even when it is within the statutory period, could compel the Collector to make hasty awards without adequate consideration of evidence and claims. The statute provides a clear maximum period, and any delay within this period cannot be deemed fatal to the acquisition proceedings. The Court affirmed that the two-year period prescribed by Section 11-A is the maximum time allowed, and the award made within this period is valid. Therefore, the allegation of inordinate delay was not sufficient to quash the award. Conclusion The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, rejecting the petitioner's contentions on both grounds. The Court clarified that the award is valid as long as it is signed within the two-year period stipulated by Section 11-A, regardless of when the notice is served. Additionally, the Court found no merit in the argument of inordinate delay, as the award was made within the statutory period. The Special Leave Petition was dismissed.
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