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Issues:
- Determination of court fees payable under Sub-section (iv-A) of Section 7 for a suit involving cancellation or adjudging void instruments securing money or property. - Interpretation of the term "instrument" in the context of Acts passed by the Central or State Legislature. - Analysis of whether a statute can be considered an instrument securing money or other property. - Evaluation of the relief sought in the suit to ascertain the appropriate court fees under different provisions of the Court-fees Act. Analysis: The appellant-company filed a suit against the State of Uttar Pradesh and the Union of India seeking a permanent injunction against the realization of sugarcane cess and purchase tax. The dispute revolved around the court fees payable on the plaint, with the Chief Inspector of Stamps contending that fees should be paid under Sub-section (iv) (a) of Section 7, while the trial judge held that Clause (b) of Sub-section (iv-B) applied. The High Court determined that Sub-section (iv-A) of Section 7 was applicable as the Acts in question were considered instruments securing money. The central issue was whether an Act could be classified as an instrument and if it secured money or property. The interpretation of the term "instrument" was crucial in this case. The Court referred to various legal dictionaries to understand the meaning, highlighting that an instrument generally refers to a formal legal writing. The discussion also touched upon the distinction between a statute and a statutory instrument, emphasizing that a statute is the will of the legislature and differs from a statutory instrument. The Court examined precedents to establish that a statute is not typically considered an instrument unless specifically defined as such in certain circumstances. The Court ultimately concluded that the Acts alleged to be void were not instruments within the meaning of Sub-section (iv-A) of Section 7. Therefore, the High Court's decision to demand additional court fees under that provision was deemed incorrect. The appellant's argument that the suit should be treated as a declaratory decree with an injunction as consequential relief under Sub-section (iv) (a) of Section 7 was also dismissed. The Court emphasized that the relief sought in the plaint was primarily an injunction, and the claim of the Acts being void did not translate into a specific request for a declaration of their invalidity. In light of the above analysis, the Supreme Court held that neither Clause (a) of Sub-section 7 nor Sub-section (iv-A) of Section 7 applied in this case. Consequently, the court fees payable on the plaint were determined to fall under Clause (b) of Sub-section (iv-B) of Section 7. The appeal was allowed, the High Court's order was set aside, and the trial court's decision was reinstated, with costs awarded to the appellant-company.
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