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Issues Involved:
1. Nature of Appointment (Permanent vs. Temporary) 2. Powers of the Vice-Chancellor u/s 13(7) of the Act 3. Allegations of Fraud and Collusion 4. Judicial Interference in University Affairs Summary: 1. Nature of Appointment (Permanent vs. Temporary): The plaintiff-respondent was initially appointed as an Accountant and later as a "Senior Assistant" before being asked to teach classes temporarily. He was appointed temporarily on 25th February 1970, and his appointment was to terminate on 20th April 1970. Despite a Selection Committee recommending his name first for the post, the Executive Committee decided to advertise the post again, leading to the plaintiff-respondent filing a suit for a permanent injunction to restrain the University from terminating his services. The Trial Court dismissed the suit, but the Appellate District Court decreed in favor of the plaintiff-respondent, interpreting his appointment as permanent. The High Court affirmed this judgment but modified the injunction, stating it would become inoperative if the plaintiff's services were terminated for valid reasons. 2. Powers of the Vice-Chancellor u/s 13(7) of the Act: The High Court interpreted Section 13(7) of the Act as conferring the power of absolute appointment to a permanent vacancy upon the Vice-Chancellor. However, the Supreme Court found this interpretation incorrect, stating that the Vice-Chancellor's powers were confined to making a tentative decision subject to confirmation by the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee had the final authority to specify the nature of the appointment, and the Vice-Chancellor's emergency powers were meant for emergent situations necessitating immediate action. 3. Allegations of Fraud and Collusion: The plaintiff-respondent alleged that there had been an alteration and interpolation in the recommendation of the Selection Committee to make it appear temporary. The Supreme Court found that the first Appellate Court had lightly believed in the fraud allegations without sufficient particulars as required u/r Order VI, Rule 4, Civil Procedure Code. The Court emphasized that general allegations of fraud or collusion without specific details are insufficient. 4. Judicial Interference in University Affairs: The Supreme Court observed that courts should be reluctant to interfere in the internal affairs of educational institutions and should refuse to grant an injunction unless a strong prima-facie case is made. The Court found no justification for continuing the injunction granted to the plaintiff-respondent and allowed the appeal, setting aside the decree and order of the High Court and restoring those of the Trial Court. The parties were left free to adjust their differences, and the plaintiff-respondent was free to seek relief based on any new rights acquired from subsequent facts. Conclusion: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's decree, and restored the Trial Court's order, emphasizing the limited powers of the Vice-Chancellor u/s 13(7) of the Act and the need for specific allegations in fraud claims. The Court also highlighted the importance of judicial restraint in interfering with the internal affairs of educational institutions.
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