1987 (4) TMI 71 - HC - Wealth-tax

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of the relevant law for quantifying penalty under Section 18 of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957.
2. Competence of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to consider the merits of the case in appeals against rectification orders when the original penalty was accepted by the assessee.

Detailed Analysis:

Issue 1: Applicability of Relevant Law for Quantifying Penalty under Section 18 of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957

The core question was whether the date of the decision to initiate penalty proceedings governs the applicable law for quantifying the penalty under Section 18 of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957. The court referred to the recent binding decision of the Supreme Court in Maya Rani Punj v. CIT [1986] 157 ITR 330 (SC), which concluded that "the relevant date for ascertaining the rate of penalty will be the date on which the satisfaction of the assessing officer is arrived at, namely, the date when the proceedings for levy of penalty are initiated." This principle was derived from the Constitution Bench judgment in Jain Brothers v. Union of India [1970] 77 ITR 107 (SC), which stated that "for the imposition of penalty, it is not the assessment year or the date of the filing of the return which is important but it is the satisfaction of the income-tax authorities that a default has been committed by the assessee which would attract the provisions relating to penalty."

The court noted that the default of non-filing of the return within the stipulated time is a continuing offence, and the imposition of penalty is not confined to the first default but continues as long as the default persists. This was affirmed in Maya Rani Punj's case, where the Supreme Court held that "the proper provision to apply for dealing with the situation relating to penalty is as provided in section 271(1)(a) of the 1961 Act."

The court rejected the argument that the provisions of the Wealth-tax Act and the Income-tax Act are different, stating that they are in pari materia. The court also overruled the decision in CIT/CWT v. Jagjit Kaur [1986] 162 ITR 844 (Pat), which had held that penalty should be computed on different rates applicable during each period of default.

Conclusively, the court held that the date of the decision to initiate penalty proceedings governs the relevant law applicable for quantifying the penalty under Section 18 of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957. The answer to question No. (1) was rendered in the affirmative, in favor of the Revenue and against the assessee.

Issue 2: Competence of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to Consider Merits in Appeals Against Rectification Orders

The second issue was whether the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was competent to consider the merits of the case in appeals against rectification orders when the original penalty was accepted by the assessee. The court referred to the Division Bench judgment in Ramanand Singh & Co. v. CIT [1987] 164 ITR 78 (Pat), which concluded that "the assessee in an appeal against an order under section 154 of the Act could not challenge the validity of the order imposing penalty under section 271(1)(a) of the Act."

The court also cited the Bombay High Court decision in Arvind N. Mafatlal v. ITO [1957] 32 ITR 350, upheld by the Supreme Court, which held that an assessee who does not appeal against the original order of assessment cannot challenge other errors in the order of assessment during rectification proceedings.

The court rejected the assessee's reliance on isolated lines from other judgments, emphasizing the importance of the ratio decidendi and not every passing observation. The court found no reason to differ from the view in Ramanand Singh & Co. v. CIT, which had been arrived at after an exhaustive discussion of principle and precedent.

Therefore, the answer to question No. (2) was rendered in the negative, in favor of the Revenue and against the assessee.

Conclusion:
The court concluded both issues in favor of the Revenue and against the assessee. There was no order as to costs.