2005 (8) TMI 409 - AT - Service Tax

Courier Service Direct and Indirect service both are covered (ii) Demand can not sustain without show cause notice.

Summary

Issues:
Challenge to confirmation of demands post-February 2001 without Show Cause Notice, rejection of adjustment claim under Section 68 read with Section 65(20) of Finance Act, 1994 regarding Courier Agency's definition and abatement claim.

Confirmation of Demands without Show Cause Notice:
The appellant contested the confirmation of demands post-February 2001 without a Show Cause Notice. The Tribunal referred to Apex Court judgments emphasizing the mandatory requirement of a Show Cause Notice for raising demands. Citing cases like Gokak Patel Volkart, Madhumilan Syntex, and Metal Forgings, the Tribunal held that demands without a specific Show Cause Notice are unsustainable. Consequently, the confirmation of demands from February 2001 onwards was set aside.

Rejection of Adjustment Claim under Section 68 and Section 65(20):
The appellants challenged the rejection of their adjustment claim under Section 68 read with Section 65(20) of the Finance Act, 1994, related to the definition of Courier Agency. They argued that the activity of customers delivering documents to the appellant's office should not fall under the definition of Courier services. The Tribunal analyzed the definition of 'Courier agency' as per the Act, emphasizing 'door-to-door transportation' of time-sensitive documents. It rejected the appellant's interpretation that excluded cases where customers delivered documents to the courier office. The Tribunal concurred with the Commissioner (Appeals) that such deliveries should also be considered 'door-to-door' transportation, thereby rejecting the restrictive interpretation sought by the appellants.

Abatement Claim of Duty Paid:
The appellants claimed abatement of duty paid concerning customers delivering documents to their office, arguing that such cases were not covered by the definition of Courier Service. The Tribunal examined the Act's definition of 'Courier agency,' highlighting the transportation of time-sensitive documents from one place to another. It dismissed the appellant's contention, stating that utilizing services for document delivery, regardless of the customer coming to the courier office, falls under the definition of 'Courier Agency.' The Tribunal concurred with the Commissioner (Appeals) on this point and modified the impugned order accordingly. The appeal was disposed of, upholding the broader interpretation of 'door-to-door transportation' under the Courier Agency definition.