1973 (3) TMI 140 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:

1. Validity of the lease agreement and its classification under the U.P. Urban Area Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1956.
2. The applicability of Article 31A of the Constitution to Section 2(1)(d) of the Act.
3. Determination of whether the land in dispute is an "agricultural area."
4. Validity of the Government notification under Section 8 of the Act.
5. Abatement of suits and appeals under the Act.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of the Lease Agreement and its Classification under the Act:

The lease deed executed on June 23, 1926, granted Plot No. 4635A to Bateshwar Dayal for purposes including planting a grove, erecting buildings, and digging wells. The lease was for 30 years with a renewal option for another 30 years. Upon expiration of the initial term, the trust sought possession of the land, leading to a series of legal disputes.

The primary contention was whether the lease fell under Section 2(1)(d) of the U.P. Urban Area Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1956, which pertains to land leased for erecting buildings. The court observed that the lease was not exclusively for building purposes, as it also allowed for planting a grove. Since no buildings were constructed and a grove was planted, the land could be classified under Section 2(1)(c)(viii) as a grove, thus not falling exclusively under Section 2(1)(d).

2. Applicability of Article 31A of the Constitution:

The appellants argued that Section 2(1)(d) was violative of Articles 14, 19, and 31 of the Constitution and thus invalid. However, the court noted that the Act as a whole is protected by Article 31A, which safeguards laws related to agrarian reform. The court concluded that Section 2(1)(d), despite its broad language, is connected with agricultural reforms and thus receives protection under Article 31A, making it immune from constitutional challenges.

3. Determination of Whether the Land in Dispute is an "Agricultural Area":

The court emphasized that only lands used for growing crops, as a grove, or as pasture land on the relevant date could be acquired under the Act. The appellants alleged that the land was part of a residential kothi and not used for agricultural purposes. The State Government's counter-affidavit failed to address this specific plot, leaving the appellants' claim unchallenged.

The court referred to a Commissioner's report from the trial court, which indicated that the land had scattered trees and was not primarily used as a grove. This report suggested that the land did not meet the definition of "grove-land" under the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939.

4. Validity of the Government Notification under Section 8 of the Act:

The notification issued on June 16, 1964, declared the land as vested in the State. However, the court found that the State Government had not adequately demonstrated that the land was an "agricultural area" as defined by the Act. Consequently, the court quashed the notification and directed the Government to reassess the land's status in accordance with Sections 3, 4, 5, and 8 of the Act.

5. Abatement of Suits and Appeals under the Act:

The High Court had abated the suits and appeals based on the Act's provisions. The Supreme Court set aside these orders, restoring the suits and appeals to their original numbers. The court directed that the appeals be decided on merits after the appropriate authority determines whether the land is an "agricultural area." If the land is found to be agricultural, the State may issue a new notification under Section 8, and the appeals will be disposed of per the Act's provisions.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court allowed the writ petition, quashed the Government notification under Section 8, and directed a fresh determination of the land's status. The High Court's orders abating the suits and appeals were set aside, and the cases were restored for decision on merits based on the appropriate authority's findings. Each party was directed to bear its own costs.