9911796707
|
Home
Issues Involved:
1. Is the suit barred by time? 2. Is the direction given by the learned trial Judge to take accounts from the year 1895 correct, or should it be substituted with the date 24-8-1932? Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Is the suit barred by time? The appellant argued that the suit was barred by time under Article 106 or 120 of the Limitation Act, asserting that the partnership was dissolved by notices dated 23-4-1936 and 28-4-1936. The court examined whether these notices constituted a valid notice of dissolution under Section 43 of the Partnership Act. Section 43 of the Partnership Act requires that a notice for dissolution must clearly state the intention to dissolve the firm and must be communicated in writing to all partners. The court found that neither of the notices fulfilled these conditions. The notice dated 23-4-1936 merely complained about the appellant's failure to render accounts and directed him to stop certain construction works, without expressing any intention to dissolve the partnership. Similarly, the reply dated 28-4-1936 did not declare an intention to dissolve the partnership but instead suggested partitioning the property. The court held that neither notice constituted a valid notice of dissolution under Section 43 of the Partnership Act. Consequently, the partnership was not dissolved prior to the filing of the suit. The court concluded that the dissolution occurred upon the institution of the suit and the service of summons on the defendants. Therefore, Article 106 of the Limitation Act, which pertains to taking accounts of a dissolved partnership, was not applicable. The suit was not barred by time. 2. Is the direction given by the learned trial Judge to take accounts from the year 1895 correct, or should it be substituted with the date 24-8-1932? The respondents argued that the trial court erred in directing accounts to be taken from 1895, asserting that the partnership should be considered dissolved upon the death of Rai Bahadur Chandiprasad in 1906 and Sidhakaran in 1932. They contended that the partnership continued from 24-8-1932 to the date of the suit was a new partnership. The court examined whether the partnership was dissolved by the death of the partners. The court noted that while the appellant did not explicitly plead a contract to continue the partnership despite the death of a partner, the conduct of the parties indicated a continued partnership. The court referenced previous cases where the conduct of the parties was sufficient to infer an agreement that the partnership would not be dissolved by the death of a partner. The court found that the evidence on record established that the heirs of the deceased partners stepped into their shoes, indicating a continued partnership. Even assuming no explicit agreement, the court held that the admission of the legal representatives of the deceased partners as partners meant that the partnership continued until the date of the suit. The court concluded that the partnership was not dissolved by the deaths of Rai Bahadur Chandiprasad or Sidhakaran and continued from 1895 to the date of the suit. Therefore, the direction to take accounts from 1895 was correct and did not need to be amended. Conclusion: The appeal and the cross-objection were dismissed, and the court ordered that the parties bear their own costs.
|
