1979 (12) TMI 161 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether an application for special leave or an appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court is an "appeal" within the meaning of Section 13A of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950.
2. Interpretation and applicability of Section 13A of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, as amended by Ordinance 26 of 1975.
3. Whether the appellant can invoke the protection under Section 13A(c) of the Act.
4. The scope of the term "proceeding" under Section 13A.
5. The relevance of Section 22 of the Act in the context of appeals and revisions.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Whether an application for special leave or an appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court is an "appeal" within the meaning of Section 13A of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950:
The judgment clarifies that an application for special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution cannot be equated with an ordinary remedy of appeal under any provisions of law. It is an extraordinary right within the discretion of the Supreme Court. Therefore, such an application does not come within the contemplation of an appeal pending before the court under Section 13A(a). The term "proceeding" in Section 13A(a) and (b) means suit, appeal, or application for revision, as per the explanation appended to Section 13A. Hence, a suit, appeal, or application for revision must be pending on the date of commencement of the Ordinance.

2. Interpretation and applicability of Section 13A of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, as amended by Ordinance 26 of 1975:
Section 13A was introduced to provide tenants with an opportunity to deposit arrears of rent within a specified time, thereby avoiding eviction solely on the ground of non-payment of rent. The amended Section 13A extends this benefit to pending suits, appeals, and applications for revision on the date of commencement of the Ordinance, i.e., September 29, 1975. The provisions of Clauses (a) and (b) apply mutatis mutandis to all appeals or applications for revision preferred or made after the commencement of the amending Ordinance.

3. Whether the appellant can invoke the protection under Section 13A(c) of the Act:
The appellant argued that since special leave had been granted by the Supreme Court, an appeal was pending against the High Court's judgment, and thus, he was entitled to the protection under Section 13A(c). However, the judgment clarifies that there is no provision in an appeal by special leave for the presentation of a memorandum of appeal. The Supreme Court Rules state that on the grant of special leave, the petition for special leave is treated as the petition of appeal and registered and numbered as such. The terminus a quo for the purpose of Section 13A(c) is from the date of presentation of the memorandum of appeal, which does not apply to appeals by special leave.

4. The scope of the term "proceeding" under Section 13A:
The term "proceeding" as used in Section 13A refers to suits, regular appeals, and applications for revision under the ordinary law. It does not include applications for special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution. The judgment emphasizes that the legislature would have explicitly mentioned applications for special leave if it intended to include them within the ambit of "proceeding."

5. The relevance of Section 22 of the Act in the context of appeals and revisions:
Section 22 provides for appeals and revisions from every decree or order passed by a court under the Act. It specifies that no second appeal shall lie from any such decree or order, but the High Court's power of revision is not affected. The judgment indicates that Section 22 deals with decrees or orders passed under Sections 6, 7, 11, 19A, and 19C of the Act. It does not cover decrees or orders passed in suits for eviction, which lie in ordinary civil courts of competent jurisdiction. Therefore, usual rights of appeal and revision are available in eviction suits, and Section 13A(c) does not extend to appeals by special leave to the Supreme Court.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant could not take advantage of Section 13A in this appeal by special leave. The applications under Section 13A were dismissed, and the appeal was dismissed without any order as to costs. The judgment underscores that the benefits of Section 13A are confined to the hierarchy of courts specified under the Act and do not extend to appeals by special leave to the Supreme Court.