1979 (12) TMI 162 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Legality of surcharge collection by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA).
2. Alleged discriminatory treatment violating Article 14 of the Constitution.
3. Authority and delegation of powers within the DDA.
4. Maintainability of the petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Legality of Surcharge Collection by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA):
The petitioners, allottees of flats constructed by the DDA under the Middle Income Group (MIG) scheme, contested the surcharge levied as part of the sale price of the flats. They argued that the DDA, which operates on a 'no profit no loss' basis, unlawfully collected a surcharge ranging from Rs. 3,400 to Rs. 6,000 per flat, making a profit contrary to its stated policy. They contended that this surcharge was unauthorized, as it was not part of the cost price formula prescribed by the DDA. The DDA, however, justified the surcharge by stating it was used to finance housing projects for lower income groups, thereby making housing affordable for weaker sections of society.

2. Alleged Discriminatory Treatment Violating Article 14 of the Constitution:
The petitioners argued that the surcharge was discriminatory as it was not uniformly applied across all MIG schemes. They claimed that no surcharge was levied on other MIG schemes prior to November 1976 and after January 1977, except for the three schemes in question and one in Wazirpur. They alleged this violated Article 14, which guarantees equality before the law, as similarly situated individuals were treated unequally. The court, however, found that the classification by the DDA based on time, location, and other relevant factors was reasonable and did not violate Article 14. The court noted that the DDA's pricing policy, which included the surcharge, was applied uniformly within the specified period and was not arbitrary or discriminatory.

3. Authority and Delegation of Powers within the DDA:
The petitioners challenged the authority of the Vice-Chairman of the DDA to levy the surcharge, arguing that such power was not delegated to him. The court examined the relevant regulations and found that the Vice-Chairman, as the Chief Executive of the DDA, was empowered to administer the regulations and fix the disposal price of flats, including any surcharge. The court also noted that the DDA had adopted resolutions delegating these powers to the Vice-Chairman, and the surcharge was included in the disposal price approved by him, thereby making the levy authorized and valid.

4. Maintainability of the Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution:
The DDA raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the petitions under Article 32, arguing that the petitioners were seeking to reopen concluded contracts rather than enforce a fundamental right. The court acknowledged that the petitions were essentially an attempt to recover part of the purchase price paid for the flats, which was a matter of contract law rather than constitutional law. The court emphasized that Article 32 is not the appropriate remedy for such contractual disputes and that the petitioners had voluntarily entered into the contracts with full knowledge of the terms, including the price. The court, therefore, found the petitions to be an improper use of Article 32 jurisdiction.

Conclusion:
The court dismissed the petitions, finding no merit in the contentions raised by the petitioners. The surcharge levied by the DDA was deemed lawful and not discriminatory, and the Vice-Chairman was found to have the authority to include the surcharge in the disposal price. The court also reiterated that Article 32 is not the appropriate forum for resolving contractual disputes. There was no order as to costs.