2002 (7) TMI 817 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Admissibility of the review petition.
2. Applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to suits under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act.
3. Exclusion of time taken in proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution for the purpose of limitation.
4. Binding nature of precedents and ratio decidendi.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Admissibility of the Review Petition:
The review petition was filed against an order dated 1st February 2001. The respondents, who were plaintiffs in the trial court, had their suit dismissed for being filed beyond the period prescribed by Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. They sought to exclude the period during which a petition was pending before the High Court under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The trial court dismissed this application, but the High Court later condoned the delay. The review petition challenges this High Court order.

2. Applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to Suits under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act:
The core issue was whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act, which allows the exclusion of time spent in bona fide litigation in a court without jurisdiction, applies to suits under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, which prescribes a six-month limitation period for suits for possession. Section 6(1) and 6(2) of the Specific Relief Act were examined, emphasizing that no suit can be entertained after six months from the date of dispossession.

3. Exclusion of Time Taken in Proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution:
The court examined whether time taken in proceedings invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 could be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court's decision in Rameshwarlal v. Municipal Council, Tonk was pivotal, where it was held that Section 14 applies to civil proceedings, including those under Article 226, if the High Court declines to grant relief and relegates the petitioner to a civil suit. This established that Section 14 could indeed apply to exclude time spent in such proceedings.

4. Binding Nature of Precedents and Ratio Decidendi:
The court emphasized that precedents must be applied considering the context of the factual situation. The Supreme Court's decision in Beharilal v. Bhuri Devi was cited, where it was held that the time taken in proceedings under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C. could be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act for a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. This demonstrated that Section 14's applicability to Section 6 suits was settled law. The court also referenced the Gujarat High Court's decision in Bai Dahi v. Amulakhbhai Gambhirbhai Barot, which supported the view that Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act is a special law prescribing a period of limitation, thus attracting Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.

Conclusion:
The review petition was dismissed as the order did not suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record. The court held that Section 14 of the Limitation Act applies to suits under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act and that time taken in proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 can be excluded. The court also refused to stay the proceedings, directing the trial court to proceed but not pass judgment for 12 weeks.