1964 (3) TMI 122 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Enforceability of the mortgage claim against the superstructure built by the life tenant.
2. Bona fide purchaser status of the third defendant.
3. Applicability of res judicata due to prior proceedings under Section 69-A of the Transfer of Property Act.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Enforceability of the Mortgage Claim Against the Superstructure:
The plaintiffs filed a suit to recover Rs. 15,000 based on two mortgages executed by Rajakannappa, who had a life interest in the property. The mortgages explicitly included not only the existing land and buildings but also any future constructions. The primary contention was whether the plaintiffs could enforce their claim against a new building constructed by Rajakannappa.

The court concluded that the plaintiffs' rights extended to the new construction. It rejected the argument that the rights of the mortgagees were extinguished upon the death of the life tenant, Rajakannappa. The court emphasized that the English law of fixtures, based on the maxim "quic quid inaedificatur solo, solo credit," did not apply in India. Instead, it followed the precedent that improvements made on the land do not automatically become the property of the landowner. The court cited various judgments, including those of the Supreme Court, to support this view, ultimately granting the plaintiffs a mortgage decree over the newly constructed house.

2. Bona Fide Purchaser Status of the Third Defendant:
The third defendant claimed to be a bona fide purchaser without knowledge of the plaintiffs' mortgages. However, the court found that she was not a bona fide transferee. The mortgages were registered, and under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, constructive knowledge was imputed to her. Additionally, the third defendant, being the mother-in-law of the mortgagor, was found to have full knowledge of the transactions. The court dismissed her claim, affirming that the plaintiffs' rights were unaffected by the Official Assignee's sale deed, which did not mention the plaintiffs' mortgages.

3. Applicability of Res Judicata Due to Prior Proceedings:
The defendants argued that a prior decision in O.P. 30 of 1956 under Section 69-A of the Transfer of Property Act, which held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to mortgage rights over the new building, barred the current claim by res judicata. The court rejected this contention, clarifying that proceedings under Section 69-A are summary in nature and do not adjudicate on title issues. The court referenced the Privy Council and other judgments to support the view that such summary proceedings do not attract the principles of res judicata.

Conclusion:
The court allowed the appeal, decreeing the plaintiffs' suit against the superstructure at 5-A Nowroji Road with costs against the third defendant. The cross-objections filed by the fourth defendant regarding costs were dismissed, as his claim had been satisfied, and his conduct did not warrant an award of costs. The appeal was ultimately allowed, affirming the plaintiffs' mortgage rights over the newly constructed property.