1993 (12) TMI 234 - SC - Income Tax

Summary

Issues:
- Unreasonable freight charges for the carriage of Bauxite
- Relief sought by the appellant from the Railway Rate Tribunal
- Applicability of Section 36 and Section 38 of the Railways Act
- Granting of relief by the Tribunal from the date of the judgment

Analysis:

The appellant, a company manufacturing Aluminium metal, filed a complaint under Section 36(b) of the Railways Act, challenging the unreasonable freight charges for transporting Bauxite from Pandra Road to Renukoot based on an inflated distance of 714 km. The Railway Rate Tribunal, in its judgment, declared the levy of freight rate on the inflated distance as unreasonable and directed the railways to charge based on the actual distance of 568 km. The Tribunal granted relief from the date of the judgment, which the appellant contested, seeking relief from the date of the complaint in 1987.

The appellant argued that the Tribunal should have granted relief from the date of the complaint, considering the delay in constituting the Tribunal's corum and the absence of proof of hurt by the appellant. The Tribunal's authority under Section 36 and Section 38 of the Act was highlighted, empowering it to decide complaints about unreasonable rates and granting necessary relief, including passing interim and final orders.

The judgment delved into the legal principles governing the grant of relief, emphasizing the Tribunal's discretionary power to mold relief as per the facts and circumstances of the case. It discussed the distinction between administrative authorities and quasi-judicial tribunals in exercising discretion, underscoring the need for circumspection in granting relief in line with justice, equity, and good conscience.

The judgment clarified that the Tribunal's decision to limit the relief from the date of the judgment was a discretionary one, guided by the Act's provisions and the principles of just and equitable relief. It emphasized that the appellant was not entitled to relief as of right and that the Tribunal's exercise of discretion in granting relief from the judgment date was not illegal or unjust. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed without costs, as there were no compelling reasons for interference under Article 136 of the Constitution.