1999 (7) TMI 702 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Validity of G.O.Ms.No. 1524, Education (M) Department, dated 12.11.1990.
2. Doctrine of occupied field and legislative versus executive powers.
3. Government's power to issue executive instructions to downgrade posts.
4. Discrimination and equal pay for equal work.
5. Validity of G.O.Ms.No. 20, dated 8.1.1993 regarding regular pay.
6. Validity of G.O.Ms.No. 365, School Education, dated 20.8.1997 regarding monetary benefits.
7. Downgrading posts without amending statutory rules.
8. Policy decisions versus constitutional mandates.
9. Validity of agreements affecting fundamental rights.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of G.O.Ms.No. 1524, Education (M) Department, dated 12.11.1990:
The court examined whether the creation of the Secondary Grade (Junior) teacher post, which is not included in the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973, and the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Rules, 1974, was valid. The court found that the impugned Government Order was illegal and ultra vires the provisions of the Act and the Rules, and thus liable to be struck down.

2. Doctrine of occupied field and legislative versus executive powers:
The court held that once a legislature enacts a law relating to conditions of service, the executive power is displaced. The impugned order was found to be without jurisdiction as the legislature had already occupied the field with specific laws governing the service conditions of teachers.

3. Government's power to issue executive instructions to downgrade posts:
The court ruled that the Government had no power under the Act to issue executive instructions to downgrade the post of Secondary Grade Teacher to Secondary Grade (Junior) Teacher without amending the statutory rules. The executive cannot modify the statute by issuing an order.

4. Discrimination and equal pay for equal work:
The court found that the impugned Government Order resulted in unequal pay for equal work, violating Articles 14 and 39(d) of the Constitution. Both categories of teachers, performing the same functions and possessing the same qualifications, were entitled to equal pay. The order was thus deemed discriminatory and unconstitutional.

5. Validity of G.O.Ms.No. 20, dated 8.1.1993 regarding regular pay:
The court held that all appointments made under the impugned Government Orders should be treated as regular appointments, and the teachers were entitled to regular time-scale pay from their respective initial appointments, not from a later arbitrary date.

6. Validity of G.O.Ms.No. 365, School Education, dated 20.8.1997 regarding monetary benefits:
The court ruled that the monetary benefits should be provided from the date of the teachers' initial appointments, not from a later date as indicated in the Government Orders. The decision to provide benefits from 9.4.1996 was found to be arbitrary and without acceptable reasoning.

7. Downgrading posts without amending statutory rules:
The court reiterated that downgrading the post of Secondary Grade Teacher to Secondary Grade (Junior) Teacher without amending the statutory rules was illegal. The Government cannot downgrade posts through executive orders when the field is already occupied by legislation.

8. Policy decisions versus constitutional mandates:
The court emphasized that even policy decisions cannot violate fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The impugned orders were found to be violative of these constitutional provisions.

9. Validity of agreements affecting fundamental rights:
The court held that agreements executed by teachers under economic duress and unemployment, which affected their fundamental rights, were void and not binding. The court struck down the unfair and unreasonable terms in the agreements, citing the lack of equal bargaining power between the parties.

Conclusion:
The impugned Government Orders and the consequential directions of the Director of School Education were quashed as being ultra vires the Constitution. All appointments made were to be treated as regular, and the petitioners were entitled to regular time-scale pay from the date of their respective initial appointments. The writ petitions were allowed, and the interim petitions were closed without costs.