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Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the transfer order of the appellant. 2. Allegations of mala fide intent behind the transfer. 3. Compliance with procedural formalities under Rule 9(1) of IAS (Pay) Rules, 1954. 4. Equivalence of the post of Secretary, High Power Committee to the post of Chief Secretary. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Validity of the transfer order of the appellant: The appellant contested the transfer order dated January 4, 1991, which reassigned him from the post of Chief Secretary to the post of Secretary, High Power Committee, claiming it was not made bona fide for administrative exigencies but was instead motivated by the Chief Minister's displeasure. The Central Administrative Tribunal upheld the transfer, stating that the prerogative to appoint a Chief Secretary lies with the Chief Minister and the Cabinet, provided the decision is bona fide and follows statutory formalities. The Tribunal found that the appellant had no subsisting right to remain as Chief Secretary and that the transfer was not made with the ulterior motive of demoting him. 2. Allegations of mala fide intent behind the transfer: The appellant argued that his transfer was driven by the Chief Minister's displeasure with his resistance to certain proposals and his stance on anti-corruption measures. The Tribunal found no firm foundation for these allegations, considering them vague and indefinite. The Tribunal noted that differences of opinion between the appellant and the Chief Minister existed, but this alone did not substantiate claims of mala fide intent. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that reasonable inferences of mala fide must be based on a factual matrix, not on insinuations or conjecture. The Court concluded that the appellant had not established a prima facie case of mala fide intent. 3. Compliance with procedural formalities under Rule 9(1) of IAS (Pay) Rules, 1954: The appellant contended that the transfer was invalid due to non-compliance with Rule 9(1) of IAS (Pay) Rules, which requires a declaration of equivalence between the posts. The Tribunal found that the post of Secretary, High Power Committee, had been declared equivalent to the post of Additional Chief Secretary, and the posts of Chief Secretary and Additional Chief Secretary were interchangeable. The Tribunal accepted that a declaration of equivalence was made on January 4, 1991, before the transfer order, although the formal authenticated order was issued on January 5, 1991. The Supreme Court concurred, stating that the decision to declare equivalence was taken before the transfer, and the formal publication was a statutory requirement to give effect to the decision. The Court deemed any delay in publication as a technical violation that did not invalidate the transfer. 4. Equivalence of the post of Secretary, High Power Committee to the post of Chief Secretary: The appellant argued that the post of Secretary, High Power Committee, was inferior to the post of Chief Secretary and that the declaration of equivalence was invalid. The respondents maintained that the posts were equivalent, with the Tribunal noting that the post of Secretary, High Power Committee, was declared equivalent to the post of Additional Chief Secretary, which in turn was equivalent to the post of Chief Secretary. The Supreme Court found that a decision to declare the post of Secretary, High Power Committee, equivalent to the post of Chief Secretary was made prior to the transfer order. The Court held that the formal publication of this decision on January 5, 1991, did not invalidate the transfer, as the decision had already been taken on January 4, 1991. Conclusion: The Supreme Court upheld the Central Administrative Tribunal's decision, finding no mala fide intent or procedural violations that would invalidate the transfer order. The appeal was dismissed without any order as to costs.
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