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Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Article 96, Limitation Act. 2. Applicability of Article 52, Limitation Act. 3. Whether electric energy constitutes "goods" under Article 52, Limitation Act. 4. The period of limitation for the claim. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Applicability of Article 96, Limitation Act: The primary question was whether the claim for electric energy supplied could be allowed for the entire period of nearly five years under Article 96, which relates to a suit brought for "relief on the ground of mistake." The Civil Judge held that the case was covered by Article 96, allowing a period of three years from the date when the mistake became known to the plaintiff. The appellant contended that Article 96 was not applicable, arguing that the mistake was discovered only in July 1941. However, the Court concluded that Article 96 would not apply to this case as the suit was brought for the price of something supplied, and the liability to pay this price was not affected by the mistake. The mistake only explained the delay in making the claim. 2. Applicability of Article 52, Limitation Act: The appellant argued that Article 52, which relates to a suit for the price of goods sold and delivered, should apply, allowing a period of three years from the date of delivery of the goods. The respondent countered that Article 52 would not apply because electric energy is not goods, and payment for electric energy is made only on demand. The Court examined several cases, including Firm Attar Singh Sant Singh v. Municipal Committee Amritsar and Narumal Hirachand v. Nanumal Benarsidas, which supported the principle that a suit must be founded on a mistake for Article 96 to apply. The Court concluded that Article 52 was applicable, as the suit was for the price of electric energy supplied, and the mistake only explained the delay in making the claim. 3. Whether Electric Energy Constitutes "Goods" Under Article 52, Limitation Act: The Court considered whether electric energy could be classified as "goods" within the meaning of Article 52. The word "goods" is not defined in the Limitation Act, but according to the Indian Sale of Goods Act, it means "every kind of movable property" other than actionable claims and money. The Court noted that electric energy is bought and sold like any other commodity and can be transmitted or sent from one place to another, implying that it is movable. The Court also referred to the Indian Electricity Act of 1910, which provides for theft of energy, indicating that electric energy is considered movable property. Consequently, the Court held that electric energy is "movable property" and therefore "goods" within the meaning of Article 52. 4. The Period of Limitation for the Claim: The Court concluded that the decree should have been confined to a period of three years prior to the institution of the suit, as per Article 52. The suit was instituted on 7th January 1942, and thus the claim could only be allowed for the period from 7th January 1939 to 7th January 1942. The Court set aside the original decree and remanded the case to the lower Court with the direction to pass another decree for the amount due for these three years and to allow the parties costs in proportion to their success and failure. Conclusion: The appeal was allowed to the extent that the decree was confined to a period of three years prior to the institution of the suit. The case was remanded to the lower Court for recalculating the amount due for this period. The judgment was concurred by both judges, with one judge agreeing and having nothing to add.
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