2014 (3) TMI 1165 - SC - Indian Laws

Termination of services of the respondents herein which were brought invoking the doctrine of pleasure as enshrined under Article 310 of the Constitution of India, 1950 - HELD THAT - Indisputably, defence personnel fall under the category where President has absolute pleasure to discontinue the services. Further in our considered opinion as far as security is concerned, the safeguard available to civil servants under Article 311 is not available to defence personnel as judicial review is very limited. In cases where continuance of Army officers in service is not practicable for security purposes and there is loss of confidence and potential risk to the security issue then such officers can be removed under the pleasure doctrine. As a matter of fact, Section 18 of the Army Act is in consonance with the constitutional powers conferred on the President empowering the President to terminate the services on the basis of material brought to his notice. In such cases, the Army officers are not entitled to claim an opportunity of hearing. In our considered opinion the pleasure doctrine can be invoked by the President at any stage of enquiry on being satisfied that continuance of any officer is not in the interest of and security of the State. It is therefore not a camouflage as urged by the respondents. Whether the order of dismissal of the earlier writ petitions and confirmation of the same by this court amounts to Doctrine of Merger and operates as res judicata against the present appeals? - HELD THAT - The Union of India has been consistently contesting these petitions and this Court has found substance in the argument of the appellants that the High Court while delivering the judgment dated 21.12.2000 overlooked this important legal aspect of finality coupled with the doctrine of res judicata. In our considered opinion, this aspect cannot be ignored and the issue of fact cannot be re-opened in the instant case as well as has been done under the impugned judgment by relying on certain material which the High Court described to have been fraudulently withheld from the courts. In our opinion, fraud is not a term or ornament nor can it be presumed to exist on the basis of a mere inference on some alleged material that is stated to have been discovered later on. The discovery of a reinvestigated fact could have been a ground of review in the same proceedings, but the same cannot be in our opinion made the basis for re-opening the issue through a fresh round of litigation. The High Court has committed a manifest error by not lawfully defining the scope of the fresh round of litigation on the principles of res judicata and doctrine of finality. To establish fraud, it is the material available which may lead to the conclusion that the failure to produce the material was deliberate or suppressed or even otherwise occasioned a failure of justice. This also, can be attempted if legally permissible only in the said proceedings and not in a collateral challenge raised after the matter has been finally decided in the first round of litigation. Analysing entire facts of the case and the material produced in Court and upon an exhaustive consideration of the matter, we are of the definite opinion that the power of pleasure exercised by the President in terminating the services of the respondents does not suffer from any illegality, bias or malafide or based on any other extraneous ground, and the same cannot be challenged on the ground that it is a camouflage - the onus lay on the respondent- officers who alleged malafides. No credible evidence or material produced before the Court impels us to come to the conclusion that the order of termination is baseless or malafide. Appeal allowed.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Validity of termination orders under Section 18 of the Army Act.
2. Applicability of the doctrine of pleasure under Article 310 of the Constitution.
3. Judicial review of termination orders based on alleged malafides.
4. Impact of res judicata on subsequent litigation.
5. Non-production of relevant records and its implications.
6. Alleged fraud and legal malice in the termination process.
7. The role of fundamental rights in the context of armed forces' termination.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of Termination Orders Under Section 18 of the Army Act:
The appeals challenge the Delhi High Court's decision quashing termination orders and General Court Martial (GCM) proceedings against certain army officers. The Supreme Court emphasized that the termination orders were issued under Section 18 of the Army Act, invoking the doctrine of pleasure under Article 310 of the Constitution. The Court noted that the termination orders were based on material evidence reviewed by the Army Headquarters and the Ministry of Defence, and approved by the Prime Minister and the President. The Court concluded that the termination orders were valid and not arbitrary or capricious.

2. Applicability of the Doctrine of Pleasure Under Article 310 of the Constitution:
The Court reiterated that the doctrine of pleasure allows the President to terminate the services of army officers without assigning reasons, as long as the decision is based on valid grounds. The Court emphasized that the doctrine of pleasure is a constitutional necessity for maintaining the security and efficiency of the armed forces. The Court held that the termination orders were issued in the interest of national security and were not subject to the same level of judicial scrutiny as civilian employment terminations.

3. Judicial Review of Termination Orders Based on Alleged Malafides:
The Court acknowledged that termination orders under Section 18 of the Army Act could be challenged on the grounds of malafides. However, it placed the burden of proof on the respondents to establish prima facie evidence of malafides. The Court found that the respondents failed to provide credible evidence to support their claims of malafides. The Court emphasized that judicial review in such cases is limited and should not interfere with the discretion exercised by the President in matters of national security.

4. Impact of Res Judicata on Subsequent Litigation:
The Court addressed the issue of res judicata, noting that the respondents had previously challenged their termination orders in writ petitions, which were dismissed by the Delhi High Court and upheld by the Supreme Court. The Court held that the principle of res judicata barred the respondents from re-litigating the same issues in subsequent proceedings. The Court emphasized the importance of finality in litigation and rejected the respondents' attempts to reopen settled matters.

5. Non-Production of Relevant Records and Its Implications:
The respondents argued that the non-production of relevant records by the appellants indicated malafides and a lack of material evidence supporting the termination orders. The Court reviewed the records and found that the relevant documents, including confessional statements and recommendations from the Army Headquarters, were produced and considered by the authorities. The Court concluded that the termination orders were based on sufficient material evidence and that the non-production argument lacked merit.

6. Alleged Fraud and Legal Malice in the Termination Process:
The respondents alleged that the termination orders were issued fraudulently and with legal malice. The Court rejected these claims, finding no credible evidence to support allegations of fraud or malice. The Court emphasized that the termination orders were issued following a thorough investigation and based on valid grounds related to national security. The Court held that the respondents failed to establish any basis for their claims of fraud or malice.

7. The Role of Fundamental Rights in the Context of Armed Forces' Termination:
The respondents argued that their fundamental rights under Articles 14, 16, 19, and 21 of the Constitution were violated by the termination orders. The Court acknowledged that while fundamental rights are important, the unique context of the armed forces requires a different standard of review. The Court held that the termination orders were issued in the interest of national security and were not arbitrary or unreasonable. The Court concluded that the respondents' fundamental rights were not violated by the termination orders.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the Delhi High Court's judgment and upholding the termination orders issued under Section 18 of the Army Act. The Court emphasized the limited scope of judicial review in matters involving national security and the doctrine of pleasure. The Court held that the termination orders were valid, based on sufficient material evidence, and not issued with malafides or legal malice. The principle of res judicata barred the respondents from re-litigating settled matters, and their fundamental rights were not violated by the termination orders.