2012 (3) TMI 525 - SC - Indian Laws

Whether misconduct has been detrimental to the public interest? Held that - Appeal allowed. The order impugned removing the appellant from the post and declaring him further disqualified for a period of six years had been passed. It is not evident from the order impugned as what could be those new grounds which had not been disclosed to the appellant. Thus, to ascertain as to whether in order to give an opportunity to the appellant to meet the alleged new grounds, the competent authority had adjourned the case, this Court while reserving the judgment vide order dated 13.2.2012 asked the learned Standing Counsel for the State Shri Mike Prakash Desai to produce the original record before this Court within a period of two weeks. For the reasons best known to the State Authorities neither the record has been produced before us, nor any application has been filed to extend the time to produce the same.

Issues Involved:
1. Misconduct of the appellant under Section 55B of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats, and Industrial Townships Act, 1965.
2. Procedural fairness and adherence to principles of natural justice.
3. Recording of reasons for the decision.
4. Malice in law.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Misconduct of the appellant under Section 55B of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats, and Industrial Townships Act, 1965:

The appellant was charged with six counts of misconduct, of which three were held proved. These included not calling a General Body Meeting within the stipulated period, and accepting tenders at higher rates for incomplete work of laying down 300 mm CI pipeline for water supply. The appellant argued that the failure to call the meeting was inadvertent and not intentional, and that the acceptance of tenders was a collective decision of the Council, not his alone. The court defined misconduct as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, or a dereliction from duty, and concluded that mere error of judgment or negligence does not amount to misconduct unless it is detrimental to public interest.

2. Procedural fairness and adherence to principles of natural justice:

The court emphasized that removal of an elected official must follow strict adherence to statutory provisions and principles of natural justice. The appellant argued that the order of disqualification was passed without affording him an opportunity to respond to new grounds raised during the hearing. The court noted that the competent authority did not record reasons for the conclusions and failed to consider the appellant's explanation. The court held that the removal of an elected official without following the prescribed procedure and without a fair opportunity of defense violates principles of natural justice.

3. Recording of reasons for the decision:

The court stressed the importance of recording reasons in administrative and judicial orders. It noted that the impugned order lacked detailed reasoning and did not address the appellant's explanations. The court cited previous judgments emphasizing that reasons are essential to demonstrate that the authority has applied its mind and to ensure transparency and fairness in decision-making. The absence of reasons renders an order indefensible and unsustainable.

4. Malice in law:

The court discussed the concept of malice in law, which refers to actions taken without lawful excuse or for purposes foreign to those intended by law. The court found that the impugned order exhibited legal malice as it was passed without proper application of mind and in disregard of statutory safeguards. The court noted that the complaint against the appellant appeared to be motivated by political rivalry and that the complainant did not have the legal standing to be a party to the proceedings.

Conclusion:

The court concluded that the first charge of not calling the meeting did not warrant removal, and the other charges were not proved as the acceptance of tenders was a collective decision of the Council. The court held that the removal of the appellant was a case of legal malice and that the statutory safeguards were not followed. The court set aside the impugned orders, reinstating the appellant's position and declaring that no order of removal had ever been passed against him. The court also directed an inquiry into the state's non-compliance with its order to produce the original record.

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