1956 (8) TMI 72 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Power of the R.T.A. to review its own order.
2. Maintainability of the appeal against the R.T.A.'s order rejecting the review application.
3. Jurisdiction of the Appeal Board to condone the delay in filing an appeal.
4. Applicability of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act to the R.T.A.'s order.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Power of the R.T.A. to review its own order:
The petitioner argued that the R.T.A. has no power to review its order under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, or the rules framed under it. The court agreed, stating that "there is no provision for a review by the R.T.A. or even by the Appeal Board of its own order." The court emphasized that "a power of review is not inherent in any authority" and that once a decision is made, the authority becomes functus officio, except for correcting clerical errors. Therefore, the R.T.A. had no power to entertain or review its own order.

2. Maintainability of the appeal against the R.T.A.'s order rejecting the review application:
The court examined whether an appeal could be made against the R.T.A.'s order rejecting the review application. The court concluded that "there is no appeal to the Appeal Board against an order passed by the R.T.A. rejecting an application for review," as the Act does not provide for such an appeal. The court held that the R.T.A.'s order dated 26-2-1953 was appealable under Section 64(a) of the Act, but the appeal filed on 25-5-1953 was beyond the 30-day limitation period.

3. Jurisdiction of the Appeal Board to condone the delay in filing an appeal:
The court addressed whether the Appeal Board had jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing the appeal. The court noted that the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules framed under it do not provide for condoning the delay in filing an appeal. The court referred to Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, which states that the remaining provisions of the Limitation Act, including Section 5, do not apply unless specifically made applicable by the special or local law. The court concluded that "the Appeal Board had no jurisdiction to entertain the time-barred appeal" and that the order passed by the Appeal Board on 3-3-1956 was without jurisdiction.

4. Applicability of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act to the R.T.A.'s order:
The Advocate-General argued that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act allowed the R.T.A. to amend or rescind its order. The court rejected this argument, stating that Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act does not mention the word "order" and only refers to the refusal to "grant" a permit. The court held that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act could not be applied to this case, as there was no existing order to vary or amend.

Conclusion:
The court allowed the application, made the rule absolute, and issued a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the Appeal Board dated 3-3-1956. The petitioner was entitled to costs, with a hearing fee of Rs. 100. The judgment was concurred by both judges involved in the case.