1994 (10) TMI 326 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Condensation of delay in filing the appeal.
2. Application of Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act.
3. Jurisdiction of the Registrar of Trade Marks.
4. Bona fide and due diligence in prosecuting the review application.
5. Legal principles for condoning delay.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Condensation of Delay in Filing the Appeal:
The appellant sought condensation of delay in filing the appeal under Section 109 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. The appeal was filed on May 1, 1992, against the order dated October 25, 1991, by the Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks. The appellant argued that the period spent in pursuing a review application should be excluded from the computation of the limitation period.

2. Application of Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act:
The court examined whether Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act could be invoked in this case. It was established that Section 5 allows for the condensation of delay if sufficient cause is shown, and Section 14 provides for the exclusion of time spent in prosecuting another proceeding in good faith. The court referred to several precedents, including Brij Indar Singh v. Lala Kanshi Ram, which emphasized reasonable diligence in prosecuting an appeal.

3. Jurisdiction of the Registrar of Trade Marks:
The appellant had filed a review application under Section 97(c) of the Act, which was dismissed by the Deputy Registrar on March 9, 1992. The dismissal was based on the grounds that the review application did not fall within the principles that warrant a review. The court considered whether the Registrar had the jurisdiction to entertain the review application and concluded that the dismissal was due to a defect of jurisdiction, thus making the principles of Section 14 applicable.

4. Bona Fide and Due Diligence in Prosecuting the Review Application:
The appellant argued that they had diligently and in a bona fide manner pursued the remedy of review. The court found that the appellant had acted with due diligence, as evidenced by the issuance of notice and the detailed arguments presented during the review application process. The court cited several cases, including Ramdhani Muchi v. Khakshardas Tati, which supported the notion that bona fide prosecution of a review application justifies the exclusion of time under Section 14.

5. Legal Principles for Condoning Delay:
The court discussed the necessity of adopting a liberal and justice-oriented approach in condoning delays, as laid down in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji. The court emphasized that refusing to condone delay could result in a meritorious matter being dismissed at the threshold. It was noted that the appellant had been diligently protecting its rights and there was no deliberate abandonment of rights.

Conclusion:
The court concluded that the appellant had shown sufficient cause for the condensation of delay. The period spent in prosecuting the review application was excluded from the limitation period, and the appeal was deemed to have been filed within the prescribed 90 days. The application for condensation of delay was allowed.