9911796707
|
Home
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the expression 'interlocutory order' under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. covers the framing of the charge during the trial or not. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Interpretation of 'Interlocutory Order' under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C.: The primary issue is whether the framing of a charge during a trial can be classified as an 'interlocutory order' under Section 397(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.). The petitioner, accused of sheltering Pakistani nationals in violation of the Foreigners Act, challenged the framing of charges against him. The High Court had to determine if such an order could be revised under Section 397(1) Cr.P.C., given the restriction in Section 397(2) against revising interlocutory orders. 2. Legal Interpretations and Precedents: The court examined various precedents and legal interpretations of 'interlocutory order' and 'final order.' It noted that the term 'interlocutory order' had not been defined in the Cr.P.C., leading to reliance on judicial interpretations. Generally, an 'interlocutory order' is the converse of a 'final order.' However, the court had to determine if this interpretation applied to Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. 3. Historical Context and Legislative Intent: The court considered the historical context and legislative intent behind Section 397(2) Cr.P.C., which was introduced to prevent delays in criminal proceedings by barring revisions against interlocutory orders. The Law Commission's reports and the Statements of Objects and Reasons for the 1973 Code emphasized the need to avoid delays and ensure fair trials. 4. Supreme Court Precedents: The court reviewed several Supreme Court judgments, including Amarnath v. State of Haryana, Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, and V.C. Shukla v. State. In Amarnath, the Supreme Court held that orders affecting the rights of the accused or significant aspects of the trial are not 'interlocutory orders.' In Madhu Limaye, it was emphasized that the term 'interlocutory order' should be given a restricted meaning to ensure the revisional power of the High Court is not rendered nugatory. V.C. Shukla's case, dealing with the Special Courts Act, was distinguished as it was based on the specific provisions and objectives of that Act. 5. Tests for Determining 'Interlocutory Order': The court discussed various tests to determine whether an order is interlocutory or final. These include whether the order determines the main dispute, whether it was made upon an application that could have decided the main dispute, and whether the order, if reversed, would allow the action to continue. The court noted that orders affecting significant rights or concluding a stage of proceedings are not merely interlocutory. 6. Impact on Rights and Fair Trial: The court emphasized that an order framing charges is significant as it affects the accused's right to liberty and subjects them to trial. Such an order concludes the pre-trial stage and determines that the accused must face trial. Therefore, it is not merely an interlocutory order but one of moment, affecting substantial rights. 7. Article 21 of the Constitution: The court considered the implications of Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. It held that the procedure established by law must be fair, just, and reasonable. The power of revision under Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. serves as a protective measure to ensure fairness and prevent miscarriage of justice. Conclusion: The court concluded that an order framing charges is not an 'interlocutory order' within the meaning of Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. It is an order of moment that affects substantial rights and concludes the pre-trial stage. Therefore, such an order is amenable to revision under Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. The reference was answered accordingly, and the revision petition was directed to be listed before the learned single Judge for a decision on merits.
|
