2005 (4) TMI 636 - HC - Income Tax

Summary

Issues:
1. Whether an intimation received by the assessee under Section 143(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 could be revised by the Commissioner of Income-tax under Section 264 of the Act after 1.6.1999 when the explanation to Section 143 of the Act had been deleted by the Finance Act, 1999 with effect from 1.6.1999.

Detailed Analysis:
The judgment by the Karnataka High Court dealt with the issue of whether an intimation received by the assessee under Section 143(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 could be revised by the Commissioner of Income-tax under Section 264 of the Act after 1.6.1999 following the deletion of the explanation to Section 143 of the Act by the Finance Act, 1999. The Court noted that the relevant assessment years were 1998-99, 1999-2000, and 2000-01, where the income tax returns of the assessee were processed under Section 143(1) of the Act, and intimations were sent. The assessee filed revision petitions before the Commissioner of Income Tax under Section 264 of the Act, which were dismissed on the grounds that they were not maintainable due to the deletion of the explanation to Section 143 after 1.6.1999.

The Court referred to the provisions of Section 264 of the Act, which empower the Commissioner to revise orders passed by subordinate authorities. However, the Court highlighted that the explanation to Section 143 deemed the intimation sent to the assessee as an order for the purpose of Section 264. The Court emphasized that the deletion of this explanation by the Finance Act, 1999 meant that the intimation under Section 143 ceased to be an order eligible for revision under Section 264 after 1.6.1999. Consequently, any intimation received by the assessee after this date could not be revised by the Commissioner of Income Tax.

In conclusion, the Court held that the Commissioner was correct in rejecting the revision petitions challenging the intimations received after 1.6.1999 for the relevant assessment years. The judgment allowed the writ appeals, set aside the order of the single Judge, and dismissed the writ petitions, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.