1902 (12) TMI 4 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Act No. XVII of 1876 to property outside its local extent.
2. Competency of Chaudhri Fateh Bahadur Singh to enter into a contract.
3. Whether the house in suit was under the charge of the Court of Wards.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Applicability of Act No. XVII of 1876 to Property Outside Its Local Extent:

The appellants argued that the order under Act No. XVII of 1876 could not apply to property situated outside the local extent of that Act. The court examined Section 173 of Act No. XVII of 1876, which states that persons whose property is under the superintendence of the Court of Wards shall not be competent to create any charge upon or interest in such property without the sanction of the Court. The court noted that the Act extends only to the territories under the administration of the Chief Commissioner of Oudh. However, the court reasoned that the Legislature's intention in creating the Court of Wards was to relieve incapable persons from managing their property, irrespective of geographical considerations. The court found it unreasonable to draw a sharp boundary line based on geography, deeming it manifestly absurd to consider a person incapable of managing property on one side of a river but capable on the other side. The court referred to historical regulations and acts, such as Regulation X of 1793 and Regulation LII of 1803, which aimed to safeguard the interests of incapable proprietors without geographical limitations. The court concluded that the incapacity to contract created by Act No. XVII of 1876 was not dependent on local limitations but was of absolute and universal obligation.

2. Competency of Chaudhri Fateh Bahadur Singh to Enter into a Contract:

The appellants contended that Chaudhri Fateh Bahadur Singh was competent in law to contract and sell the house. The court examined the principles of law regarding the capacity to contract, citing eminent jurists like A.V. Dicey and Story. It was established that a person's capacity to enter into a contract is governed by the law of their domicile at the time of making the contract. If a person is incapacitated by the law of their domicile, any contract entered into by them is invalid, even outside the limits of that law. The court referred to leading cases such as Sottomayor v. De Barros, In re Cooke's Trusts, and Cooper v. Cooper, which supported the principle that personal incapacity to contract depends on the law of domicile. Applying this principle, the court held that Chaudhri Fateh Bahadur Singh, being incapacitated by the law prevailing in Oudh, was incapable of entering into any contract with reference to the property under the superintendence of the Court of Wards, including the house in Cawnpore.

3. Whether the House in Suit Was Under the Charge of the Court of Wards:

The appellants argued that the house in suit was never placed under the charge of, and therefore never vested in, the Court of Wards. The court noted that the house was not entered in the list of property prepared by Chaudhri Fateh Bahadur Singh when he applied to the Court of Wards to be disqualified from managing his estate. However, the court agreed with the lower appellate court that the whole of the property of a ward vests in the Court of Wards when it takes up the management of the ward's estate, especially when it is not shown that any property was specially reserved from the control of the Court of Wards. The court found that the house at Cawnpore formed part of Chaudhri Fateh Bahadur Singh's property at the time of the contract and therefore came under the superintendence of the Court of Wards by virtue of the Government order. Consequently, Chaudhri Fateh Bahadur Singh could not create any charge upon or interest in the house.

Conclusion:

The court dismissed the appeal, holding that Chaudhri Fateh Bahadur Singh was incapable of entering into a contract regarding the house in Cawnpore due to the incapacity created by Act No. XVII of 1876. The court also held that the house was under the superintendence of the Court of Wards, and the contract could not be enforced against either defendant. The appeal was dismissed with costs.