1985 (9) TMI 357 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:

1. Declaration of title over B, C, and D schedule lands.
2. Validity of deeds of gift and sale deed.
3. Allegations of fraud and deception.
4. Suit barred by the law of limitation.
5. Burden of proof regarding execution of deeds by an illiterate lady.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Declaration of Title Over B, C, and D Schedule Lands:

The deceased respondent Champa Dibya, represented by her successor Bhabani Dei, sought a declaration of her title over the B, C, and D schedule lands. The trial court accepted Champa's case and declared her title over the suit properties. It was held that Champa and defendant 1 were each entitled to an eight-annas share out of Schedule 'A' properties. The court ordered a partition if no amicable settlement was reached within a month.

2. Validity of Deeds of Gift and Sale Deed:

Champa claimed that the deeds of gift and the sale deed were executed by her under fraud and deception. The trial court found these deeds invalid and set them aside. The gift deeds (Exts. A and A/1) in favor of defendants 2 and 4 and the sale deed in favor of defendant 5 were declared invalid. The appellate court upheld this finding, emphasizing that Champa was an illiterate lady and the deeds were executed without her understanding the nature of the transactions.

3. Allegations of Fraud and Deception:

Champa alleged that appellant 2, taking advantage of her illness and illiteracy, fraudulently obtained her signatures on the deeds by misrepresenting them as a power-of-attorney. The trial court found that Champa was unaware of the true nature of the transactions and that the deeds were executed under undue influence. The appellate court agreed, noting that Champa was under the care of appellant 2, who exploited her vulnerability.

4. Suit Barred by the Law of Limitation:

The appellants attempted to argue that the suit was barred by the law of limitation, citing Article 59 of the Limitation Act. However, this ground was not raised in the written statement or the memorandum of appeal. The appellate court refused to entertain this contention, stating that the date of knowledge regarding the execution of deeds is a question of fact and should have been raised earlier to allow proper evidence to be led.

5. Burden of Proof Regarding Execution of Deeds by an Illiterate Lady:

The court emphasized that the burden of proof lies on the person transacting with a pardanashin or illiterate lady to show that the terms are fair and equitable and that she had independent advice. The appellate court cited precedents, including the Privy Council and the Supreme Court, to affirm that the onus is on the person relying on the deed to prove that the lady understood the nature and effect of the transaction. The court found that the appellants failed to discharge this burden, as there was no evidence that Champa had independent advice or understood the contents of the deeds.

Conclusion:

The appellate court upheld the trial court's findings, maintaining the judgment and decree. The appeal was dismissed with costs to respondent 1/a. The court reiterated the principles protecting illiterate and pardanashin ladies in property transactions, emphasizing the need for independent advice and a clear understanding of the transaction.