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Issues Involved:
1. Liability of the respondents to ejectment from the encroachments of pavements. 2. Obligation of the appellant to provide permanent residence to the hutment dwellers. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Liability of the Respondents to Ejectment from the Encroachments of Pavements: The Supreme Court examined whether the respondents are liable to ejectment from the pavements and whether the principle of natural justice, viz., audi alteram partem, requires to be followed. The Court referred to Sections 63(1)(19) and 231 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act (BPMC Act), which empower the Commissioner to remove any unauthorized structures on streets or pavements. The Court emphasized that public property like footpaths and pavements are intended for public use and not for private encroachments. It cited the Constitution Bench's decision in Sodan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, which held that while citizens have the right to trade, they do not have the right to occupy specific places on public pavements for their business. Similarly, in Olga Tellis v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, the Court upheld the reasonableness of procedures for removing encroachments. The Court concluded that the principle of natural justice does not necessitate a hearing in every case of recent encroachment, but if the encroachment has been allowed for a long time, a reasonable notice period must be given. The action taken by the appellant-Corporation was not found to violate the principles of natural justice. 2. Obligation of the Appellant to Provide Permanent Residence to the Hutment Dwellers: The Court considered whether the appellant is obligated to provide permanent residence to the hutment dwellers. It referred to Article 19(1)(e) and Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantee the right to residence and the right to life, respectively. The Court also cited international human rights instruments like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which recognize the right to adequate housing. In Chameli Singh v. State of U.P., the Court had held that the right to shelter is a fundamental right under Article 21. The Court noted that the appellant-Corporation had resolved not to remove pavement dwellers existing as of May 1, 1976, without providing alternative accommodation. Several schemes were in place to provide housing to the urban poor, including the Narol Scheme, Vinzol Site and Services Scheme, and the Economically Weaker Sections Scheme. The Court acknowledged the appellant's efforts but also noted the respondents' concerns about the distance of the alternative sites from their current locations, which could affect their livelihood. The Court emphasized the constitutional duty of the State and local bodies to provide adequate housing facilities to the weaker sections of society. It highlighted the need for the appellant-Corporation to evolve and implement schemes to provide housing to the urban poor. The Court directed the Corporation to offer the 10 original petitioners the option to choose from the available schemes, provided they meet the eligibility criteria. The Court also addressed the issue of those who had encroached or purchased encroachments after the original petition, stating they are not entitled to the same benefits. Conclusion: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, modifying the High Court's order. The Court directed the appellant-Corporation to provide alternative housing options to the 10 original petitioners, subject to their eligibility. The Court emphasized the importance of removing encroachments on public pavements while balancing the need to provide adequate housing to the urban poor. The Court also highlighted the constitutional duty of the State and local bodies to ensure socio-economic justice and the right to shelter. The writ petitions were disposed of accordingly, with no order as to costs.
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