2018 (11) TMI 1915 - SC - Indian Laws

Rape or consensual sex? - appellant failed to marry as promised, and married some other woman - Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure - HELD THAT - It is well settled that exercise of powers Under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is the exception and not the rule. Under this section, the High Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But the expressions abuse of process of law or to secure the ends of justice do not confer unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court and the alleged abuse of process of law or the ends of justice could only be secured in accordance with law, including procedural law and not otherwise. In the instant case, FIR was registered against the Appellant and the co-accused Under Sections 376(2)(b), 420 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. Section 376(2)(b) prescribes punishment for the offence of rape committed by a public servant taking advantage of his official position on a woman in his custody as such public servant or in the custody of a public servant subordinate to him. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex. The court, in such cases, must very carefully examine whether the complainant had actually wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide motives and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the later falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is also a distinction between mere breach of a promise and not fulfilling a false promise. If the Accused has not made the promise with the sole intention to seduce the prosecutrix to indulge in sexual acts, such an act would not amount to rape - If the complainant had any mala fide intention and if he had clandestine motives, it is a clear case of rape. The acknowledged consensual physical relationship between the parties would not constitute an offence Under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. In the instant case, it is an admitted position that the Appellant was serving as a Medical Officer in the Primary Health Centre and the complainant was working as an Assistant Nurse in the same health centre and that the is a widow. It was alleged by her that the Appellant informed her that he is a married man and that he has differences with his wife. Admittedly, they belong to different communities. It is also alleged that the Accused/Appellant needed a month's time to get their marriage registered. The complainant further states that she had fallen in love with the Appellant and that she needed a companion as she was a widow - since complainant has failed to prima facie show the commission of rape, the complaint registered Under Section 376(2)(b) cannot be sustained. The impugned order of the High Court is hereby set aside - Appeal allowed.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Quashing of FIR and chargesheet under Sections 376(2)(b), 420 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, and Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act.
2. Abuse of process of law under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
3. Distinction between consensual sex and rape under the pretext of false promise of marriage.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Quashing of FIR and Chargesheet:
The appellant sought to quash the FIR and chargesheet filed against him under Sections 376(2)(b), 420 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, and Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. The Supreme Court examined whether the allegations made in the FIR, even if taken at face value, constituted any offense. It was observed that the complainant and the appellant were in a consensual relationship, living together at times, and the complainant had taken a conscious decision to be in the relationship. The Court concluded that the allegations did not prima facie constitute the offense of rape under Section 376(2)(b) as the relationship was consensual and not a result of any misconception. Similarly, the FIR did not spell out any wrong committed under Section 420 of the IPC or Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. Consequently, the Court quashed the FIR and the chargesheet.

2. Abuse of Process of Law under Section 482 Cr.P.C.:
The appellant contended that the criminal proceedings were initiated with mala fides and an ulterior motive, constituting an abuse of the process of law. The Court reiterated that the exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is an exception and not the rule, meant to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The Court referred to the principles laid down in previous judgments, including State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, which enumerated categories where such power could be exercised. The Court found that the present case fell within these categories as the allegations did not disclose any cognizable offense and were inherently improbable.

3. Distinction Between Consensual Sex and Rape:
The Court emphasized the distinction between consensual sex and rape under the pretext of a false promise of marriage. It cited several judgments, including Uday v. State of Karnataka and Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar, which held that consent obtained under a misconception of fact, particularly a false promise of marriage, could vitiate consent. However, in the present case, the complainant was aware of the appellant's marital status and differences with his wife. The relationship was consensual, and the complainant had taken a conscious decision to live with the appellant. The Court concluded that the allegations did not constitute rape as defined under Section 375 IPC, as the complainant's consent was not obtained under any misconception of fact.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order and quashing the FIR and chargesheet against the appellant. The Court held that the allegations did not constitute any offense under the relevant sections of the IPC and the SC/ST Act, and the proceedings were an abuse of the process of law. The Court's judgment reinforced the principles governing the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and the distinction between consensual sex and rape under false promises of marriage.