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Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the affidavit supporting I.A. No. 206 of 2007. 2. Previous attempts by the first respondent to address issues before the Arbitrator. 3. Scope and application of Section 34(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 4. Consideration of fresh evidence post-arbitration award. 5. Distinction between Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and Section 34(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Validity of the Affidavit Supporting I.A. No. 206 of 2007: The petitioner argued that the affidavit supporting I.A. No. 206 of 2007 did not contain any necessary averments for remanding the case under Section 34(4) of the Act. The court found that the first respondent had made a prima facie case for setting aside the arbitration award under Section 34(2) due to the lack of opportunity to challenge the affidavit and documents submitted by the petitioner after the conclusion of arbitration proceedings. 2. Previous Attempts by the First Respondent to Address Issues Before the Arbitrator: The petitioner contended that the first respondent had previously attempted to address the same issues before the Arbitrator under Section 33 of the Act, which was dismissed. The court noted that the first respondent did not have the opportunity to challenge the affidavit and documents submitted by the petitioner after the conclusion of proceedings, thus justifying the remand. 3. Scope and Application of Section 34(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: The court discussed the scope of Section 34(4), emphasizing that it allows the court to adjourn proceedings to enable the arbitral tribunal to eliminate grounds for setting aside the award. The court highlighted that this provision is not akin to the power of remand under Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and is intended to give the tribunal an opportunity to address specific issues that may invalidate the award. 4. Consideration of Fresh Evidence Post-Arbitration Award: The court addressed the issue of whether fresh evidence obtained post-award could be considered. It noted that the arbitral tribunal might entertain additional evidence if it believes it would eliminate the grounds for setting aside the award. The court emphasized that the tribunal has discretion under Section 34(4) to determine the necessity and extent of such an exercise. 5. Distinction Between Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and Section 34(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: The court elaborated on the differences between the two sections, noting that Section 16(1) of the 1940 Act allowed the court to remit the award for reconsideration under specific conditions, while Section 34(4) of the 1996 Act empowers the court to adjourn proceedings to enable the tribunal to eliminate grounds for setting aside the award. The focus has shifted from the court's discretion to the tribunal's discretion under the new Act. Conclusion: The court modified the order of the District Court, Tuticorin, to adjourn the proceedings for three months, allowing the Arbitrator to decide whether to resume proceedings or take other actions to eliminate the grounds for setting aside the award. The Arbitrator was requested to communicate his decision within three months to the Principal District Court, Tuticorin, and the parties. The court clarified that the findings were prima facie and not conclusive, and both the Arbitrator and the District Court should consider the matter uninfluenced by these findings. The Civil Revision Petition was allowed on these terms, with no costs, and the connected miscellaneous petition was closed.
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