1991 (1) TMI 466 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Scope of the High Court's power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
2. Whether the High Court can issue directions to the appropriate Government under Section 432 of the Code to release a convict on parole.
3. Judicial precedents on the inherent powers of the High Court.
4. The distinction between judicial and executive functions in the context of parole and remission of sentences.
5. The applicability of judicial review to executive decisions under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Scope of the High Court's power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to make necessary orders to give effect to any order under the Code, prevent abuse of the process of any Court, or otherwise secure the ends of justice. The judgment clarifies that the inherent power of the High Court is confined to judicial proceedings and does not extend to executive actions. The inherent power cannot be invoked in respect of matters covered by specific provisions of the Code or if its exercise would be inconsistent with any specific provisions of the Code.

2. Whether the High Court can issue directions to the appropriate Government under Section 432 of the Code to release a convict on parole:
The judgment concludes that the High Court's inherent power under Section 482 does not extend to issuing directions to the appropriate Government under Section 432 of the Code for the release of a convict on parole. Parole is considered an administrative order, not a judicial or quasi-judicial one. The authority to grant parole lies exclusively with the executive, and the High Court cannot interfere with this executive function through its inherent powers.

3. Judicial precedents on the inherent powers of the High Court:
The judgment extensively reviews various judicial precedents, including decisions of the Supreme Court and High Courts, to elucidate the scope and limitations of the inherent powers of the High Court. Key cases discussed include T.H. Hussain v. M.P. Mondkar, Khushi Ram v. Hashim, R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, and State of West Bengal v. S.N. Basak. These cases collectively establish that the inherent power of the High Court is limited to preventing abuse of the process of the Court and securing the ends of justice within the judicial domain, and cannot be invoked to interfere with executive functions.

4. The distinction between judicial and executive functions in the context of parole and remission of sentences:
The judgment emphasizes the clear demarcation between judicial and executive functions. The power to grant parole or remit sentences is an executive function vested in the appropriate Government under Section 432 of the Code and Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution. The judiciary's role is to adjudicate cases, while the executive's role is to execute sentences and exercise clemency powers. The High Court's inherent powers do not extend to supervising or interfering with these executive functions.

5. The applicability of judicial review to executive decisions under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution:
While the High Court's inherent powers under Section 482 do not extend to executive decisions, the judgment acknowledges that judicial review of executive actions under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution is permissible. However, such review is limited to examining whether the executive authority has acted within the limits of its power or exceeded it. The Court cannot review the merits of the executive decision but can ensure that the decision is not vitiated by mala fides, extraneous considerations, or lack of jurisdiction.

Conclusion:
The judgment concludes that the High Court's inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code are confined to judicial proceedings and do not extend to executive actions such as granting parole. Any challenge to executive decisions regarding parole must be made through judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, not through the inherent powers under Section 482. The reference is answered accordingly, and petitioners are given the option to convert their petitions into writ petitions under Article 226 or file fresh petitions.