2016 (11) TMI 1252 - HC - Income Tax

Validity of the order of the ITAT - Descanting views between two members of the Tribunal - Pronouncement of order by any one Member of the Bench - Held that - Since both the parts of order one for allowing the application and another for dismissal of the application are duly signed by both the members of the bench, we find that there is apparent self contradiction and in our view, apparent self contradiction of order which comprises of two parts, cannot be sustained in the eye of law. The aforesaid is coupled with the circumstances that in both the parts of order though duly signed by both the members of Tribunal. There is no dessentment recorded in their respective part, may be first part or second part. But in the second part, judicial member has concurred with the view of administrative member irrespective of his earlier part of view for allowing of the application, which is also signed by the administrative member. Hence, we find that both the parts of order are / and can be read comprising of only one common order and self contradiction are apparent on the face of it. If both the parts are simultaneously pronounced, one for allowing of the application and another for dismissal of the application, it is not possible for us to accept the contention that first part of the order was within the jurisdiction and when second part was simultaneously pronounced, the Tribunal had already become functus officio. On the contrary, in our considered view that we do find that both the parts of the order when simultaneously pronounced would comprise of one order but with self contradictory view expressed by both the members of the Tribunal.In view of the aforesaid, we find that the order passed by Tribunal comprising of both the parts cannot be sustained. Hence, the impugned order dated 28.04.2016 comprising of both the parts of order, one for allowing the application and another for dismissal of the application, is set aside with the direction that the main OA shall stand restored to the Tribunal.

Summary

Issues:
1. Contradictory orders passed by two members of the Tribunal.
2. Interpretation of Central Administrative Tribunal Rules of Practice, 1993.
3. Application of Section 26 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985.
4. Functioning of the Tribunal and the concept of functus officio.

Analysis:

Contradictory Orders by Tribunal Members:
The judgment addresses the issue of contradictory orders passed by two members of the Tribunal on the same date. The first part of the order allowed the application while the second part dismissed it. Both parts were signed by both members, creating confusion. The judicial member concurred with the administrative member's decision in the second part, leading to self-contradiction. The judgment emphasizes that conflicting views must be signed by the respective members, and unanimity is required for the operative portion of the order.

Interpretation of Central Administrative Tribunal Rules:
The judgment delves into Rules 106 and 107 of the Central Administrative Tribunal Rules of Practice, 1993. These rules dictate the procedure for pronouncing orders by Tribunal members. The rules presuppose unanimity in the ultimate operative direction of the order. In case of dissenting views, the respective member must express their own view. The judgment highlights that the sanctity of judicial orders must be maintained, and conclusive views are essential for resolving disputes effectively.

Application of Section 26 of the Administrative Tribunal Act:
Section 26 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985, is analyzed to resolve the issue of differing opinions among Tribunal members. The section mandates that if members are equally divided, they must state the points of difference and refer the case for further consideration. The judgment clarifies that Section 26 takes precedence over procedural rules, emphasizing the importance of majority opinions in decision-making within the Tribunal.

Functioning of the Tribunal and Functus Officio:
The concept of functus officio is examined concerning the Tribunal's authority to pronounce orders. The judgment clarifies that both parts of the order were pronounced simultaneously on the same date. It dismisses the argument that the Tribunal had become functus officio after the first part, as both parts were part of a single order. The Tribunal's functioning and the need for coherence in decision-making are underscored, leading to the setting aside of the impugned order for further examination.

In conclusion, the judgment provides a detailed analysis of the issues surrounding contradictory orders, the interpretation of relevant rules and laws, and the functioning of the Tribunal in ensuring fair and coherent decision-making processes.