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1976 (10) TMI 22 - HC - Income TaxAAC And Tribunal Interim Dividend Revision By Commissioner Tax Deducted At Source Writ Petition
Issues Involved:
1. Assessability of Rs. 7,81,500 as dividend under section 2(6A)(e) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. 2. Applicability of the expression 'payment for the benefit of the assessee' under section 2(6A)(e) to the loan transaction. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Assessability of Rs. 7,81,500 as Dividend: The primary issue was whether the sum of Rs. 7,81,500 advanced to the assessee could be assessed as a dividend under section 2(6A)(e) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, for the assessment year 1961-62. The Income-tax Officer had concluded that the loan taken by Karuppiah Chettiar from the company was substantially for the benefit of the assessee, thus treating it as a dividend. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner, however, held that Karuppiah Chettiar was not a dummy or agent of the assessee and that the loan could not be considered a payment to the assessee. The Tribunal upheld this view, leading to the revenue's challenge before the High Court. 2. Applicability of 'Payment for the Benefit of the Assessee': The second issue was whether the loan transaction fell under the expression 'payment for the benefit of the assessee' as per section 2(6A)(e). The Tribunal had concluded that the loan to Karuppiah Chettiar did not constitute a payment for the benefit of the assessee. The High Court, however, found that the Tribunal had committed an error in interpreting the word "payment" and had overlooked the admissions made by the assessee himself. Detailed Analysis: Assessability of Rs. 7,81,500 as Dividend: The High Court noted that if the second question was answered in favor of the revenue, it would follow that the first question would also be answered in favor of the revenue. Therefore, the court first examined the second question. Applicability of 'Payment for the Benefit of the Assessee': Section 2(6A)(e) includes three types of transactions: (i) Payment by a company to a shareholder by way of advance or loan. (ii) Payment by a company on behalf of a shareholder. (iii) Payment by a company for the individual benefit of a shareholder. The court observed that the first and second contingencies did not apply as there was no direct payment to the assessee or on behalf of the assessee. The focus was on the third contingency-whether the payment to Karuppiah Chettiar was for the individual benefit of the assessee. The Tribunal had relied on two main points: 1. The loan was to the Hindu undivided family, not directly to the assessee. 2. The term "payment" implied discharge of a liability or debt, not a loan or advance. The High Court disagreed with the Tribunal's interpretation, stating that the ordinary meaning of "payment" is simply the act of paying money, without implying discharge of a pre-existing liability. The court found that the Tribunal's conclusion that a loan does not constitute a "payment" was erroneous. The High Court emphasized the admissions made by the assessee during the examination, which clearly indicated that the loans from the company to Karuppiah Chettiar were intended for the assessee's benefit. The court noted that the assessee admitted to having a business relationship with Karuppiah Chettiar, wherein he would receive loans from him, who in turn obtained these loans from the company. The court found that these admissions were crucial and had been overlooked by the Tribunal. The court also noted that Karuppiah Chettiar, an employee of the company with a modest salary, was able to obtain substantial loans from the company without any security, which he then lent to the assessee. This strongly indicated that the loans were for the benefit of the assessee. Conclusion: The High Court concluded that the transactions clearly fell within the third contingency of section 2(6A)(e), i.e., payment by the company to Karuppiah Chettiar for the benefit of the assessee. Therefore, the court answered the second question in the negative and against the assessee, leading to the first question also being answered in the negative and against the assessee. The Commissioner was entitled to the costs of the references, with a counsel's fee of Rs. 500.
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