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Issues:
1. Challenge to the order imposing duty and penalty under Central Excise Rules. 2. Interpretation of provisions of Section 5 and Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act in relation to Central Excises and Salt Act. Detailed Analysis: 1. The petitioner filed a writ petition challenging the order of the respondent imposing duty and penalty for alleged clandestine removal of tobacco. The petitioner held a L.2 License and contended that he was unaware of the requirement for a L.4 license for manufacturing smoking mixture. The Collector imposed duty and penalty, which the petitioner disputed, arguing that he did not commit any offense willfully. The petitioner also raised the issue of limitation under Rule 10 of the Rules. The Collector's order was challenged in the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 2. The main contention raised during the hearing was regarding the application of Section 5 and Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act in conjunction with Section 35 of the Central Excises and Salt Act. The petitioner argued that the appellate and revisional authorities did not properly construe these provisions. The petitioner cited the case of Mangu Ram v. Delhi Municipality to support the argument that delay in proceedings before quasi-judicial or executive authorities can be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. However, the Central Government's standing counsel argued that the provisions of Chapter VI-A of the Act, introduced by an amendment, were not applicable to the case, and the limitations under the Central Excises and Salt Act were to be followed. 3. The court determined that the principles established in previous rulings indicated that the rules of limitation under Sections 5 and 29(2) of the Limitation Act do not apply to proceedings before executive authorities. The appellate and revisional authorities correctly concluded that they had no power to condone the delay, especially when the delay was minimal. The court held that the order of the respondent, which had become final, did not warrant interference. As the provisions of Chapter VI-A were introduced post the events in question, they were not applicable retrospectively. Therefore, the writ petition was dismissed with costs, and the order of the respondent was upheld.
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