1989 (10) TMI 62 - HC - Customs

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the order passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate without notice to the petitioner.
2. Implications of the order on the petitioner's rights and principles of natural justice.
3. Requirement of notice and hearing under Section 110 (1-A) of the Customs Act.
4. Application of principles of natural justice in judicial and administrative proceedings.

Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Legality of the order passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate without notice to the petitioner:

The petition challenges the legality of an order dated 25th April 1989, passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, on an application by the Customs Department under Section 110 (1-A) of the Customs Act, 1962. The petitioner contends that the order is inherently defective as it was passed without any notice to him, thereby prejudicially affecting his rights and denying him an opportunity to be heard.

2. Implications of the order on the petitioner's rights and principles of natural justice:

The petitioner was arrested following the recovery of contraband goods from his premises and faced prosecution under Section 135 of the Customs Act. He argued that the order for preparing an inventory and disposing of the seized goods without his notice would severely impact his defense during the trial and adjudication proceedings. The petitioner emphasized that the principle of natural justice, specifically the rule of audi alteram partem (hearing both parties), should have been observed.

3. Requirement of notice and hearing under Section 110 (1-A) of the Customs Act:

The petitioner relied on the Supreme Court judgments, including Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (AIR 1978 SC 597) and Harbans Lal v. M.I. Wadhawan (AIR 1987 SC 217), to argue that even in the absence of an express provision for notice, the principles of natural justice necessitate such a requirement. The court agreed, noting that the disposal of case property under Section 110 (1-A) of the Customs Act has serious implications for the accused, and thus, notice and hearing are essential.

4. Application of principles of natural justice in judicial and administrative proceedings:

The court highlighted that the principles of natural justice apply to both judicial and administrative proceedings. It referred to various judgments, including Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (AIR 1986 SC 180) and A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1988) 2 SCC 602, to reinforce that any order affecting a party's rights must be preceded by notice and an opportunity to be heard. The court found that the Customs Department's application under Section 110 (1-B) of the Customs Act, which implicitly aimed at disposing of the seized goods, required notice to the petitioner.

Conclusion:

The court concluded that the order passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate without notice to the petitioner was unsustainable and vitiated due to the lack of an opportunity for the petitioner to be heard. The petition was allowed, and the order dated 25th April 1989 was set aside. The court directed that the application under Section 110 (1-A) of the Customs Act be taken up afresh by the concerned court after issuing notice to the petitioner. The trial court was instructed to proceed further in light of the observations made in the judgment, ensuring compliance with the principles of natural justice.